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Abstract
This thesis explores the poverty alleviation and peace-spoiling power of the
mineral extraction sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to arrive at a set of
strategic goals for the country moving forward. Although subterranean minerals are often
a source or perpetuator of violence, the potential to lift the country’s rural communities
out of extreme poverty makes the mining industry an essential part of the nation’s
development strategies. Lessons from Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Ethiopia,
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and Sierra Leone to arrive at best practices
for increasing the multiplier effect of large-scale mining, formalization, beneficiation,
capital resource development, stakeholder harmonization and conflict control. The study
also finds that in order to smoothly construct and implement new programs, the
traditional roles and positioning of government, corporate and community stakeholders
must change toward increased inclusion.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suffers from extreme poverty, with
63.6 percent of people living below the international poverty line1 and a rank of 176 out
of 187 in the United Nations Human Development Index.2 Ongoing conflicts have
limited the impact of development efforts and rampant corruption within the government
has robbed the country’s poorest communities of opportunities for economic opportunity.
The country does, however, have the latent potential it needs to address its
poverty problems given the ability and impetus to effectively manage its resources. Vast
reserves of subterranean minerals provide a powerful opportunity for economic
development that, when concentrated in particularly poor areas, can have a major impact
on the quality of life for the poor. In order to do this, the country’s government will need
to control for the possibility of mineral wealth perpetuating violence while ensuring that
the profits of the mining sector are channeled into economically marginalized
communities and not into the hands of foreign investors or government bureaucrats.
This development can come in two primary ways. First, by supporting artisanal
and small-scale mining, the government can increase the number of people profiting from
mining through direct employment. Second, by supporting the growth of industrial largescale mining operations largely funded by foreign investors, the government can channel
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mining revenues into poorer communities and provide opportunities for economic
development through small business ownership.
The Situation in the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the midst of a long-term
conflict that has claimed approximately 5 million lives to date.3 At the center of this
conflict is the fight for control over valuable mineral resources that have provided the
funding for the more than 70 militant groups operating within the region.4 At present, the
Congolese government has little control over its most mineral rich regions, particularly
the Eastern Kivu provinces, making it difficult to impose a rule of law within areas with
heavy mining activities. One rebel group in particular, the National Congress for the
Defense of People (CNDP) holds an area entirely outside of the control of the Congolese
government and United Nations peacekeeping forces under claims that it is protecting
Rwandan Tutsis from Hutu militias operating in the region.5 The group is heavily backed
by the Rwandan government. The Congolese government will need to develop the
capacity to create and enforce stabilizing legislation before it heavily pursues a
formalized and legalized mineral trade.
In 2009, progress toward improving the country’s economic strength was made
with the signing of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility between the DRC and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), effectively giving the country almost US$12 billion
in debt relief. These payments were suspended in 2012 due to international concerns
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about transparency in mining contracts.6 In 2015, the DRC ranked in the ninth percentile7
for corruption control according to the World Bank, meaning that the level of corruption
within the nation is incredibly high. The Congolese government is widely considered to
be a kleptocracy, with government officials using positions and access to public resources
to secure their own wealth. Most recently, the release of the Panama Papers implicated
the president at the time, Joseph Kabila, is colluding with foreign investors to sign
secretive mining deals that are often not to the public’s benefit.8
With about 60 percent of the population inhabiting rural areas, much of the DRC
works in the informal sector, relying heavily on subsistence mining and agriculture.9
Developing the capacity to exploit natural resources legally will likely prove an important
part of the Congo’s economic development, however the country must first reach a state
in which its government is accountable and transparent enough to work with the
international community and protect the interests of its citizens. Therefore, in order to
undertake the formalization of the mining sector and harmonize its practices with the
country’s development needs, the DRC must first move closer to the point at which it can
be classified as a development state. In other words, the majority of the government must
consciously prioritize the welfare of its constituents and be willing to undertake policies
that result in social benefit. While total peace is not necessarily required, the government
does have to have sufficient capacity to enforce its decisions, meaning at least definite
control over its own military and a corruption level low enough to trust that law
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enforcement and members of government will act lawfully and in the interest of the
public. Only under these conditions can a mineral extraction policy framework have a
significant positive impact on the DRC. Feasible implementation of the recommendations
of this thesis will be contingent upon the country reaching this point.
According to the World Bank, the formal mining sector in the DRC accounts for
approximately 12 percent of GDP,10 meaning that although responsible development of
this industry will have a powerful impact on those involved and can add some degree of
economic prosperity to the country, mining is not this country’s economic deus ex
machina. Rather, mining presents an opportunity to both directly and indirectly affect the
nation’s poorest people by facilitating easier and more profitable artisanal mining and by
concentrating the benefits of industrial mining into poorer communities while controlling
for the negative side effects some industrial mines have had.
The primary minerals mined in the DRC are cobalt, copper, gold, coltan and
diamonds (See Appendix A), although the mining industry is highly diverse. While yields
are difficult to calculate given the informality of the sector and the prevalence of black
market exports, the DRC is a major global producer of precious and industrial minerals.
According to the United States Geological Survey, the DRC ranks fifth in the world for
copper exports11, and tenth in the world for tin production, even with the underreporting
issue unaccounted for.
The mining sector in the DRC has traditionally been dominated by large-scale
mining operations, limiting the government’s interest in engaging with the artisanal
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mining sector.12 However, with the ongoing conflict in the region, the productivity of
large-scale mining and foreign investors’ interest in operating in the country has declined,
opening up space for artisanal miners to create illegally operated mines in order to
survive.13 A vast amount of gold mining and almost all diamond production now occurs
at small-scale and artisanal sites.14 As artisanal mining grows in economic importance,
the post-conflict re-entry of large-scale mining companies will need to be handled
sensitively to prevent conflict and the destruction of livelihoods.
The actual system of mining management, where minerals are not controlled by
foreign corporations, is heavily driven by the influence of armed groups. After miners
discover minerals, they usually pay a percentage of their find to the local authorities
running the mine, generally an armed group, and then sell their ores to the negociants
who pay porters to carry the minerals to a trading post at a nearby urban center. Because
of the severe infrastructure deficit that exists in many mining regions, many porters must
transport the heavy minerals by foot, usually around 40 miles.15 At the trading posts,
most middlemen, or comptoirs, operate illegally and without a license, due in part to the
excessive expense of obtaining legal permission to export, which can be upwards of
US$40,000 per year.16 These comptoirs are usually connected to armed groups which
then export the minerals out of the country, often taking advantage of neighboring
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countries’ lower export taxes to move the ore into processing facilities owned by foreign
corporations, which process about 80 percent of exported Congolese minerals.17
Usually, these illegal exports exit through Rwanda.18 Rwanda is a favorite of
illegal exporters due to its lack of export taxes and a loophole whereby goods that have
30 percent of their value added through additional processing may be declared as
officially produced domestically within Rwanda, allowing them to be officially certified
under international mineral export agreements.19
Given the need for economic opportunity, there is a strong case for regulation and
development of the mineral extraction industry in the DRC. The most important may be
the opportunity for poverty alleviation. While the DRC is not resource rich in real terms,
its mining industry is rich enough to be politically and economically significant and does
present a major opportunity to bring revenue to the poorest members of society, if it is
managed effectively.
For the majority citizens in the DRC who live on less than US $1.25 per day,
entering into a profitable industry like mineral extraction would have huge benefits for
their socioeconomic situations.20 Already, over 500,000 people21 in the DRC work
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directly in artisanal mines and it is estimated that the artisanal mining sector supports
upwards of 10 million people, largely in the Eastern Kivu provinces.22
Additionally, although mining is associated with a high degree of violence,
human rights violations, and other illegal activity23, building proper regulation of the
industry and actively exploiting minerals for the benefit of the nation at large may
actually prove an effective way of controlling the influence of militants on the mining
sector. Ignoring the opportunity for mineral extraction will likely preserve the status quo
of illegal and unregulated mining activities and continue the flow of profits into armed
groups rather than subsistence mining communities.

Addressing the Human Rights Crisis
Perhaps the largest barrier to using the mining sector to propel the country out of
poverty at the present is the ongoing conflict and human rights disaster dominating the
lives of mining communities. While a post-conflict poverty alleviation strategy does not
necessarily have to take full responsibility for addressing the causes of conflict and
achieving peace, it does have to take into account the implications that years of war will
have for the country’s poorer communities and the scars it will leave on the mining
industry in particular.
The most widely understood human rights atrocities committed in the Congo are
often assumed to occur in mines under rebel control. There are, however, numerous other
violations that are often overlooked and are, without intervention, likely to persist in the
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post-conflict state. The role of the government and its affiliates, foreign corporations, and
side effects of mining activities that affect Congolese citizens who do not work in the
mines all contribute to the situation. One such side effect is the forced eviction of
subsistence farmers and charcoal producers, as was the case in the town of Luisha.
Originally a traditional rural village, it grew into an informal town when artisanal mining
drew crowds into the region in the 1990’s. According to a field report by Amnesty
International published in 2013, many people were living in makeshift tents and,
“According to those interviewed some 300 households were
forcibly evicted when a Chinese company, Congo International Mining
Corporation (CIMCO) was given the rights to the site in the centre of
Luisha, where they had been living since 2007. CIMCO had been given
the site to build a processing plant. When the community was told by a
local administrative official, in about July 2011, that they would have to
move from their homes because their land had been given to CIMCO they
raised concerns with the local authorities. The official reportedly told them
they did not have rights to the plots of land on which many had built brick
houses, although most had paid CF25,000 to the local chief, in line with
customary land use practices in the area.24
Following this dispute, the families were packed into trucks and relocated to a
new site that reportedly lacked housing and other basic facilities, left to rebuild their lives
unaided. Chinese companies are not the only perpetrators. In one instance, the entire
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village of Kibisha was relocated to Kimfumpa to make way for the Luxembourgian
Eurasian Resource Group’s Frontier Mine.
Luisha is not a unique case, with as many as 3,400,000 Congolese people
currently living as internally displaced persons due to mining-induced eviction or miningrelated violence.25 In addition to displacement, mining activities have crippled
communities by restricting access to resources. As another report notes,
“On 19 April 2012 COMILU, a Chinese-Congolese joint venture,
accompanied by police, used bulldozers and diggers to excavate a deep
trench about 3 metres wide, blocking off a rural road crossing near Luisha.
Local people had used the road for decades to reach their fields and to
access water. With this route closed off they had to spend considerably
longer travelling to and from their fields and water source. When people
protested about the trench, police fired live ammunition in the air and one
man was killed by a stray bullet.”26
These issues are particularly significant, as they are committed by privately
owned mining operations working in tandem with the government of the DRC. While the
torture, execution and massacre of civilians is likely to end once the government of the
DRC reclaims firm control of its territory, these less documented abuses are likely to
persist even after the conflict ends unless proactive measures are put in place to deter
such violations of citizens’ rights. An effective post-conflict mineral extraction policy
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will have to take into account the conduct it expects from foreign companies operating
within its borders and determine the appropriate enforcement mechanisms that will
protect its population from issues like forced relocation and limited resource access.
There are also hazards that arise from the lack of proper attention paid to safety in
the mines. Landslides and mine collapses are a common cause of death among miners,
and many more suffer chronic heart and lung problems as a result of their time in the
mines. Additionally, tantalum, one of the country’s most profitable mining yields, is
considered a naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM) due to its tendency to
contain traces of uranium and thorium. Many miners in the DRC use their bare hands, or
simple tools like spades and shovels to extract these minerals from the ground and rarely
wear masks when milling it, meaning they risk exposure to radiation from handling the
mineral and inhaling its dust. The calculated exposure to radiation is, according to the
Journal of Radiological Protection, at levels concentrated enough to mandate strict
regulation of tantalum mining and handling.27
The fact that many Congolese minerals are exported fraudulently for sale and
refinement through other nations exacerbates this situation by making it more difficult for
watchdog groups to estimate the real prevalence of Congolese conflict minerals on the
global market, and creates a loophole for private multinational corporations seeking to
publicly verify the social responsibility of their supply chains. For this reason, even
tantalum that is certified “clean” at the time of purchase likely comes from conflict mines

                                                                                                 
27

Mustapha et al. "Occupational Radiation Exposures of Artisans Mining Columbite–
tantalite in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo."
10

  

in the DRC, making foreign domestic legislation against conflict mineral use in corporate
supply chains difficult to universally enforce.

Mining and the Environment
More difficult-to-reach mineral deposits often lie underneath rainforests, which
serve as a critical refuge for biodiversity, a habitat for endangered chimpanzee
populations and other species, and important sources of extractive resources, in addition
to the positive environmental externality they provide as a major carbon sink. Using
satellite imaging, NASA’s Earth Observatory division has estimated that between 2000
and 2010, the DRC lost approximately 3,711,800 of its 159,529,000 hectares of
rainforest.28 According to field research led by Greenpeace International personnel, the
Congolese rainforest within the DRC is the only rainforest in the world that continues to
see increasing rates of deforestation and destruction.29 In addition to agriculture needs
and charcoal acquisition, the mining of valuable minerals has played a major role in this
process. The impact of mining on this process is both a direct and indirect one. On the
one hand, artisanal and industrial mining operations clear vast swaths of land in order to
dig mines. On the other hand, communities displaced by mining operations in and around
their towns often seek refuge in resource-rich rainforest areas where they can survive,
inevitably destroying or fragmenting the local forests and habitats with the necessary
construction and agricultural activities.30 Mining communities, too, often rely on
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bushmeat and the need to feed the many miners rushing into these towns has led to severe
over-hunting. Game ranger working within Kahuzi-Biega National Park (KBNP), a
UNESCO World Heritage Site, estimate that nearly all of the park’s 3,700 elephants and
3,700 gorillas have been killed, and the death toll has been expanding into areas still
controlled by park officials.31 Other national parks and World Heritage Sites have been
suffering the same fate.
Tantalum in particular is acquired by digging in deep mines or streambeds and
sifting and washing the sediment to sort out heavy particles, after which it is refined into
tantalum powder by crushing the mineral in mills. Aside from the damage that clearing
land for these activities can cause, the major environmental danger that arises during this
process is from the tantalum itself leaking into nearby water supplies either directly
through mining sites in river beds or from runoff in pit mines nearby. As a highly toxic
mineral, tantalum has the potential to contaminate the rivers that serve as the safest
sources of drinking water for many of the DRC’s rural communities.
In the gold ore refining process, most artisanal mining operations rely heavily on
mercury, leading to environmental contamination.32 While equipment and strategies such
as fume hoods and retorts exist to limit the amount of mercury being released into the
environment, and are regularly in use in industrial mining operations, these are often
difficult or expensive to implement in smaller sites.33
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Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
Artisanal and small-scale mining are non-industrial mining activities that happen
on a small-scale and local basis. Although policymakers typically draw a distinction
between these activities and large-scale operations owned by foreign corporations, for the
purposes of this thesis, the terms artisanal and small-scale mining will be used
interchangeably. Small-scale mining typically involves a greater degree of organization
and equipment use (See Appendix B) than artisanal mining, but the DRC currently draws
no legal distinction between the two, and both are considered marginalized economic
activities that will benefit from development aid.
Artisanal mining presents an important opportunity for impoverished citizens of
the DRC to drastically increase their incomes. There is, however, an often overlooked
downside to the injection of capital that the artisanal mineral trade can bring to the DRC.
For one, profits from the mineral trade are rarely invested back into the community, even
in artisanal mining operations. The profits also entice people, usually farmers and
students, to change their professions, meaning the risk of youth dropping out of school
for the promise of easy money becomes a major risk, with some communities reporting a
drop-out rate of up to 30 percent. It also causes less profitable farming land to be
repurposed into mining plots, putting the DRC at risk for even greater food scarcity.34 At
present, many rural families leave women in their village to maintain farming activities
while sending men to larger cities like Goma to earn wages in small mines, which greatly
reduces the productivity of remaining farm land and has already placed a heavy burden
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on the region’s agriculture production and driven food prices up. Most of these smallscale rural miners are still wage earners, and the risk of being paid unfairly or of losing
their profits to high food prices and nights out is high, meaning that the real impact of the
mineral trade on the poorest communities whose men perform the bulk of the labor is
fairly low.
The health risks of artisanal mining are great, as workers often enter the industry
for its low startup costs and high rewards, meaning there is little investment into or
education on proper safety equipment and practices. Workers rarely have access to, or
even understanding of, proper protective equipment, often resulting in injury and chronic
illness.35 These are generally the results of mineral dust inhalation and landslides within
the mines, as well as radiation exposure.
Because many artisanal mining operations are illegal, the industry largely
bypasses whatever health and environmental regulations do exist in the country where it
takes place.36 This puts artisanal miners at increased risk of suffering health concerns and
causing environmental degradation to the surrounding areas, and contributes to a
correlation between unregulated illegal mining and prevalent health issues in local
communities.37 The health issues associated with dust and blasting fumes may even have
a greater impact on the women and children, often involved in processing and
amalgamation or those who reside nearby the processing sites, than the men who work in
the mines themselves, meaning the unregulated mining activity can have a powerful
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negative impact on both children and individuals who do not even engage in mining
activities.38
Additionally, mining communities tend to have some of the highest rates of
HIV/AIDS and other STIs across multiple African nations.39 For example, in South
Africa, up to half of the country’s miners, including both artisanal and large-scale
industrial operations, are infected with HIV/AIDS.40 In Zambia, the infection rate is
approximately 18 percent of copper miners, a massive industry which comprises about 75
percent of the nation’s export earnings, and in Botswana, where the mineral extraction
industry is incredibly robust and accounts for over half of government revenues, one third
of miners are estimated to be HIV positive.41 This may be due to the prolific prostitution
industries that often rise up within the mining towns where miners spend much of their
time away from their rural homes, coupled with the significant lack of access to health
care that these more remote mining communities face.42
These associated health concerns make a strong case for formalization of the
informal mining sector in countries where artisanal mining presents a valuable
opportunity for poverty reduction. The first step to regulating and mitigating the negative
effects of robust mining industries is formalizing the processes by which these activities
are monitored and administrated in a way that maximizes real participation.
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Aside from health concerns, artisanal mining does have an additional benefit that
large-scale mining generally does not achieve. In African countries in particular, artisanal
mining operations tend to demand engagement from the whole workforce in order to
maximize efficiency, with the majority of African nations seeing 50 percent or more of
the artisanal mining work force composed of women.43 Even where this may not be the
case, statistics resoundingly show that women play a much greater role in artisanal
mining, particularly in mineral processing and refining, than in large-scale mining
operations. 44 Although gender roles still tend to dictate the type of labor performed,
meaning that artisanal mining cannot be a perfect fix for all of the DRC’s gender
inequalities, women are able and encouraged to work and earn their own independent
salaries in artisanal mining.45 The benefits of this are clear. Women are often some of
society’s most vulnerable and disempowered individuals and the necessity of their
involvement in artisanal mining provides a way to become economically self-sufficient
without stigma, meaning that artisanal mining can actually disrupt parts of the actual
societal structures that keep women disadvantages, in addition to benefitting society’s
most poor in general.
Small-scale mining operations also have the potential to create well-paying jobs at
a very low investment rate. Because small-scale mining is typically performed with only
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the most rudimentary tools, it tends to be highly labor intensive, but minimally capital
intensive.46 Investments into developing small-scale mines can be highly successful
because the required investment per job is typically only 10-12 percent of the money
required to create a job at an industrial plant.47
One of the biggest barriers standing in the way of this job creation is the limited
access to capital in rural communities. Expanding ventures and creating small businesses
does take some degree of investment and in rural communities, where there is little
access to formal banking and therefore lines of credit, a lack of funds can prevent miners
from lifting themselves out of subsistence living.48 The DRC is one of the countries with
the least access to banking in the world, even for a developing nation. As of 2014, about
14 percent of adults had access to formal banking, compared to 34 percent on average in
Sub Saharan Africa and 54 percent on average in developing economies.49 Currently,
rural banking in the DRC generally relies upon trusted members of the community who
are appointed money managers for several households but do not supply financial
planning or access to lines of credit.50
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The international community as partners in development
Recent approaches to limiting black market exports have focused on reducing the
demand for illegally exported minerals. Certification schemes like the Kimberly Process
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have supported efforts to require
companies using potentially illegally-acquired minerals to verify that their supply chains
are conflict free and have made strides in making the enforcement of export laws a matter
of international responsibility.51 These programs have seen some success, but do face
struggles in implementation within both mineral-producing countries and foreign supply
chains.
For example, minerals like tantalum are classified by countries like the United
States and Venezuela as a strategic minerals, meaning that although they are often
problematic to obtain, building stockpiles of these minerals is considered a necessity to
the national security objectives of many nations.52 The United States in particular is
entirely import dependent in building its reserves of tantalum, receiving much of its
supply from Central and Southern Africa.53 This leads to a conflict of priorities between
national security and human rights objectives and gives rise to a major transparency issue
outside of the Congo itself. Although there is heavy American activism for the reduction
of conflict mineral imports, namely with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Reform Act,
gathering affordable stockpiles of tantalum through accessible means, even from conflict
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regions, is a defense priority for many nations like the United States and China, which
has major stakes in acquiring Congolese tantalum through its state owned enterprises.54
Therefore, although private sector regulation plays a role in reducing the export of
conflict minerals, major buyers are often state actors prioritizing their own national
security. Therefore, in order to sustainably prevent the resurgence of violence, the
Congolese government cannot rely entirely on the goodwill of foreign governments.

Building an effective policy framework:
Given the multifaceted nature of the issue, a successful mining policy that safely
and responsibly promotes economic development within the DRC will need to be
economically comprehensive and allow for multiple safeguards against against worsening
the conflict. A successful mining policy for the DRC will accomplish the following goals:
1.   Support the formalization of the artisanal mining sector to reduce black
market exploitation and increase support for small-scale operations.
2.   Protect both artisanal and industrial miners from exploitation by militants
and foreign managing corporations and suppress the black market
activities such as fraudulent exports that could continue to fund these
groups.
3.   Promote transparency and prevent corruption in the national mining
industry and protect the government against the resumption of kleptocratic
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practices by concentrating the profits and benefits of both large- and
small-scale mining into poor rural communities.
4.   Mitigate the negative environmental effects of mining and protect the
health, welfare, and rights of miners, mining communities, and
constituents living near mineral deposits both known and unknown.
5.   Prevent the resurgence of conflict due to increased mining activities.
6.   Defend the economy and livelihoods of miners against price volatility by
diversifying industrial activities to promoting value adding activities such
as mineral refinement.
7.   Harmonize large-scale mining interests with the needs of local
communities and capitalize on opportunities for mutual benefit.
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Chapter 2: Mining Trends
The ongoing development of the mining sector in the DRC presents numerous
lessons that can guide the discussion on further policymaking. First, the role of the
mining industry in fueling and perpetuating violence cannot be ignored. However, the
industry also presents opportunities to increase the DRC’s dismal employment rates.
There have also been ongoing efforts to resolve some of these issues that the DRC has
already undertaken that will inform the prospects for future success of other initiatives.

Mining and Violent Instability
It must be noted first that natural resources are not the root cause of violence in
the DRC. They do, however, escalate the conflict by providing essential funding to
militias and increase the involvement of foreign militaries seeking to protect mineral
interests. Understanding the structure of that violence is essential to preventing a
resurgence of conflict with the expansion of the legal mineral extraction industry.
While most militias are small domestic groups numbering in the hundreds, several
of the largest groups are foreign militias from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.55
Factionalization within the Congolese military (the FARDC) itself has partly caused the
high prevalence of small militias. After the defeated M83 rebellion there was incomplete
assimilation of the rebel factions that had joined its ranks, resulting in several parallel
chains of command that do not necessarily report to the FARDC.56 These groups,
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although officially connected to the Congolese military, have a tendency to carry out
violent and criminal activities to profit from the lack of organization in the DRC’s mining
industry, blurring the lines between state-sanctioned violence and illicit activity.57 In
order to prevent a resurgence of violence as the legal mineral trade develops, the
government of the DRC will need to recognize the danger coming from within its own
military and take steps to control incentives to factionalize. Other major groups operating
in the region are branches of the Ugandan and Rwandan militaries, which run mines of
their own in the East.
The United Nations Group of Experts (UNGoE) estimates that mineral mining
brings rebel groups millions a year in income, largely from fraudulent exports into
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.58 Additionally, the International Peace Information
Service (IPIS) estimates that over half of the mining sites in the eastern Kivu provinces
nearest Rwanda are under the influence of these same militant groups.59 These violent
groups often do not act alone. In some cases, private corporations have armed and paid
rebels to secure access to minerals.60
This has resulted in economic spillage as resources are cheaply smuggled out of
the country by rebel groups and foreign companies, delivering a dual blow to the
Congolese government. First, its citizens working in and around these mines have little
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protection from the rampant human rights abuses these groups have been known to
inflict, and second, it suffers the environmental and economic cost of unearthing and
exporting its natural resources without gaining any financial benefit. The United Nations
Panel of Experts assembled on the issue summarized the issue best when it noted "no
coltan exits from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo without benefiting either the
rebel group or foreign armies."61 This illegal trade will need to be closely monitored, as
the chance that black market exports will continue is high unless the Congolese
government take steps to protect known deposits from illicit exploitation.

Job Creation
The unemployment rate in the DRC is 73 percent, with 80 percent operating in the
informal sector. This hits young professionals particularly hard, with only 100 out of
9,000 of the DRC’s university graduates finding employment equivalent to their
qualifications each year.62 This unemployment issue is a serious barrier to economic
development and needs to be resolved on both the poverty alleviation and economic
development front. Mining reform, if undertaken strategically, can accomplish both of
these. For poverty alleviation, an artisanal mining sector can help to sustain the country’s
poorest people and offer greater security and economic independence to those who are
most marginalized, as noted above. However, industrial mining can create formal jobs
that have a much greater impact on a local community because of the multiplier effect of
large-scale industrial activities. The DRC’s Chambres des Mines estimates that for every
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50,000 jobs a mining site creates through direct employment, 25,000 subcontracting jobs
and 300,000 service and manufacturing jobs must develop to support this new industrial
activity.63 Although the required investment per job is typically higher than in small-scale
mining operations, the sheer scale upon which jobs are created makes industrial mining
an important step in lifting more people out of poverty.64
The DRC can look to industrial mining as a means of inducing greater economic
vitality than small-scale mining can alone. The major barrier is in restructuring mining
policies in order to more effectively entice foreign direct investment and ensure that
industrial mining activities are carried out in such a way that the benefit for the local
community is maximized and the detrimental effects of irresponsible corporate activities
are eliminated. What policymakers must keep in mind is that the real benefit of a more
robust mining industry is not necessarily the wealth created by exporting minerals but
rather the rich business ecosystem that can, with proper aid and planning, develop around
the mining sector.
Before mining jobs can become an even more important part of the DRC’s
economy, working and living conditions in areas where mining is the primary livelihood
need to be examined. For example, in the towns around the Bisie mine in the Walikale
province, a mine infamous for its rebel involvement, public infrastructure and services
are practically non-existent.65 While this is not an issue unique to mining areas, it creates
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issues for those tasked with performing jobs normally aided by technology. Couriers,
those who are hired to transport up to 50kg of minerals at a time to larger trading posts
even occasionally die of exhaustion during their long journeys on foot through the
forest.66 Because the mining industry is largely unregulated and artisanal mining activity
is informal, the government struggles to gain the information and tax revenue necessary
to maintain state roads and other infrastructure, exacerbating the work hazards and
barriers that many artisanal miners face. A part of building an effective policy framework
will be ensuring that the mining industry is formal and regulated in order to give the
government the information, and in the case of industrial regulation, financing, it needs to
better serve rural communities.

Mining Policies in the DRC
The impact of mining on the economy of the DRC has been significant. As of
2013, mining accounted for 12 percent of the nation’s GDP and, since scaling up its
mining efforts, the nation has seen GDP increasing by up to 6 percent annually, compared
to the deep recession the country found itself facing before its decision to pursue mining
more heavily.67 Additionally, mining brings the country up to 80 percent of its foreign
direct investment revenue and, as of 2010, US$773 million in annual tax revenues,
accounting for 10 percent of the estimated revenues the government received that year.68
According to surveys conducted by the Fraser Institute, more than 50 percent of foreign
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investors view the DRC as a risky investment in practice, due largely to its unstable
policy environment and the difficulty of operating within the country, compared to five
percent of investors who viewed South Africa’s and Tanzania’s policy environments as a
deterrent.69 (See Appendix C)
In September 2010, in order to address the rampant black market exports and
human rights violations in the mining sector, president Kabila announced a mining ban
against coltan, wolframite and cassiterite, enforced by severe penalties in the case of
continued mining activities.70 While the moratorium on extraction was immediate, traders
and exporters were given time to sell their stocks, resulting in widespread stockpiling and
smuggling through neighboring countries. Additionally, the ban largely affected
industrial and artisanal mines, and had little effect on those run by rebel groups who were
already out of the state’s control. Satellite images actually show that the nation’s largest
cassiterite mine expanded during this ban.71 Not only does the legislation potentially fail
to affect the real conflict actors, but artisanal miners and small-scale traders complain that
it is hurting them instead. Researchers at the International Peace Information Service
noted that,
“In late 2010, before the presidential ban on artisanal mining, [the
town of] Bisie was home to about 13,000 people. An estimated 3,000
artisanal miners were then digging for cassiterite in deplorable conditions
at the mine. Mineral trade slowed down during the suspension but it did not
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cease. Congolese state institutions lacked the capacity and will to enforce
the ban, which was bypassed in different ways, and ironically allowed for
the further consolidation of military control over the mining sector.”72
The ban was a response to the Dodd-Frank Act, part of the international push to
verify that corporate supply chains are conflict-free, which requires American companies
to stop importing conflict minerals and prove through transparent reporting that their
supply chains are conflict-free. Seeking to comply more effectively with these laws to
maintain its exporting industry, the government of the DRC shut down the mining sector
in order to certify the nation’s exports as conflict-free. This ban, however, had disastrous
effects on the nation’s economy. What initially seemed to be a fairly straightforward
verification process extended over months and years, causing foreign investment to
stagnate and mineral prices to drop. As of 2014, only 25 mining sites had been verified as
conflict free, leaving hundreds unable to restart operations. The stagnation of the mining
industry has led to many ex-miners, frustrated with their reduced profits, to join local
militias, exacerbating the violence.73 More effective policies will focus on certification
schemes and formalization efforts that allow miners to continue supporting themselves
legally.
Local communities have also reported high levels of corruption, with authorities
exploiting the ban in order to take possession of minerals. Miners also complain of
exporters taking advantage of low prices and paying far less than the world market value
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for minerals. This depression in the mining industry has put a strain on local resource
production capacity. As traders lose interest in Congolese minerals, trade traffic in the
region stagnates, meaning that the essential resources normally brought in by traders are
far more scarce and when they do arrive, they are often far more expensive compared to
the lower price of minerals.74 This trend has caused even greater economic strain upon
the DRC’s poorest communities.
Numerous NGOs and watchdog groups have also become involved in order to
curb the expansion of the conflict minerals trade. The Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) was created as a supply chain monitoring and advising mechanism and
currently works to promote transparency and accountability among governments and the
private sector. The DRC is currently one of 51 countries to have implemented the
program.75 The NGO Solutions for Hope aims to catalogue regional and issue-specific
best practices for integrating regulation with supportive action to maintain the economic
vitality of the supply chain once new policies are put in place and another NGO, The
Enough Project, works with a team of forensic accountants and regional experts to
identify cash flows related to the conflict mineral trade and freeze the assets of armed
groups and their partners, building a degree of financial transparency that allows state
actors to more easily impose smart sanctions upon conflict industries. Other countries
outside of the United States have also developed their own certification schemes,
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including Germany’s Certified Trading Chains (BGR) scheme, which specifically
targeted the DRC and Rwanda.76
Other non-domestic efforts to limit the proliferation of conflict minerals have
included international efforts undertaken by the International Conference of the Great
Lakes Region. In June 2008, the group published the Protocol on the Fight Against the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and later adopted the Regional Initiative on
Natural Resources in 2010, both of which intended to put into place regional certification
mechanisms for limiting the illegal extraction of minerals. The 2010 adoption summit in
Lusaka also mentioned the importance of formalizing the artisanal mining sector as a top
priority.77 Due to these measures, supply chain audits and consultation-based certification
procedures are already in place. These international efforts will need to be supported by
better coordinated policy making within the country.
In 2009, the government of the DRC approved the Programme de Stabilisation et
de Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflits Armés (STAREC), or the Program for
the Stabilisation and Reconstruction of Regions Coming out of Armed Conflict, a
program designed to capitalize on the progress made against the dominance of armed
groups in the Eastern provinces and begin stability-building measures.78 Specific
measures included a new code of conduct for members of the Congolese army, and staterun trading centers put in place in hopes that they could operate independently of the
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influence of armed groups, organizing the certification and taxation process.79 These
centers have struggled to gain traction.80
Bringing foreign money into the DRC in order to implement ambitious policies
and projects has not been as big a barrier as one might think. In 2010, the DRC received
US$50 million in aid from the World Bank Group, supplemented by a US$40 million
grant from the British Department for International Development.81 The project, named
promines, was stalled due to the DRC’s licensing policies, which caused canadian firm
First Quantrum, owned in part by the International Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of
the World Bank Group, to lose its rights to mine in the region.82 The project has not yet
been implemented due to the dispute. The difficulty that the DRC often has is not in
securing funding but in project implementation and in keeping its investment climate
amicable for international financiers.83
These reform activities are supported by MONUSCO, the UN Mission for the
Stabilization of the DRC. The program replaced its predecessor, MUNOC and continues
to operate across a diverse range of interest areas, including human rights, security
reform, and stabilization strategy.84 MONUSCO remains active in the DRC.
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Although much of the mining in the DRC is artisanal and occurs in areas
controlled by armed militias, there is a legitimate government contracting process in
place that has been on a trajectory toward becoming more equitable. In 2008, public
policy nonprofit the Carter Center oversaw a review of the mining contracts that had
stood since Laurent Kabila, father of the current president, was in power. This process
was a victory for government accountability and transparency, as the results of the review
were published in full and numerous contracts were renegotiated to better favor the
Congolese people.85 So although the industrial mining sector is highly corrupt, there is
hope for success with the proper transparency and oversight mechanisms.

Existing Reform Strategies in the DRC
Many of the existing policies in the DRC focus on allowing its minerals to
compete on the international market by formalizing the mining process and certifying
yields as conflict-free. In 2012, the government of the DRC attempted to set an
expectation for corporate social responsibility by banning the two largest trading agencies
operating within the Bisie mine and its surrounding villages. Both Chinese owned, the
companies were under investigation for indirectly but knowingly financing armed groups
through their trading activities. However, because the government failed to set up
alternative options in advance, this decision actually caused the local mineral trade to
collapse.86 Attempts at verifying Bisie as a conflict-free zone and reigniting the mineral
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trade have been slowed by the presence of FARDC in the region.87 Although the two
companies’ suspensions were lifted in 2013, the two are still suspected of buying
unverified minerals and reports state that FARDC officials are still implicated in the
illicit smuggling of minerals, with police and army officials continuing to receive side
payments to guarantee security.88
The mining ban in 2010 and the post-suspension price collapse had a significant
impact on the miners who relied on the Bisie deposit for their livelihoods. In addition to
the issues associated with reduced disposable income, like reduced access to education
for children, working conditions for those who continued their mining activities
deteriorated even further. Investment in basic mining equipment such as boots and
torches declined and equipment needed for safety and environmental protection,
including water pumps for drainage, became more infrequent. Overall, mining jobs
became far more strenuous and dangerous as a result of the government’s attempts to
curtail the sale of uncertified minerals.89
In Rubaya, a village in North Kivu, mining has become increasingly important as
a source of income.90 There are numerous mines surrounding the town, many of which
are known for being under the influence of rebel group CNDP.91 Beginning in 2009,
Rubaya became a pilot site for a joint effort between the Congolese government and
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MONUSCO to expedite the validation of conflict-free minerals. First, the government
shut down the two private trading houses that had been operating in the area, which
essentially suspended trade until alternatives were put in place.92 A centre de négocé was
then put in placed within Rubaya and tasked with processing minerals prepared within a
25 mile radius of the village.93 While the measure has pleased villagers due to increased
incomes, there are still frustrations with the inability of Rubaya’s minerals to compete on
the international market, given its association with CNDP.94 The centers have also
struggled from limited resources and insecure transportation routes.
The implementation of the centre de négocé did have secondary benefits.
According to the United Nations Group of Experts, since these were put in place, the
security situation in and around Rubaya has been dramatically improving, which
provided the impetus for a new validation review.95 Performed in 2011, validation teams
composed of representatives of the DRC government, civil society, the private sector, and
MONUSCO reassessed the status of militarization within the 25km radius around
Rubaya.96 This mission as well as documents collected by the government-sponsored
centre de négocé were used in 2012 to verify 11 out of the 21 local mines as conflict-free
through the DRC’s Ministry of Mines, which legally allowed certified Rubayan minerals
back on the international market.97 The change in the security situation itself has been
attributed to police presence at mine entrances.
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Another measure adopted focused solely on the Maniema region. With a
dependence on artisanal mining similar to that of the Kivu provinces, Maniema is unique
in that its mineral trade has historically been, and remains, free of militant activity. Its
exports have remained validated for sale on international markets.98 Traditionally,
Maniema’s mineral trade centered upon the larger city of Goma as its central trade
location, with regular flights carrying minerals from smaller villages delivering regular
shipments into the city for processing and export. The issue with this lied in the fact that
Goma lies within the Kivu region, where minerals have been largely banned from
international export due to the presence of rebel groups.99 To break this traditional cycle,
the Congolese government banned the small flights into Goma, instead forcing minerals
to be transported over land into the Katanga region, where they could be sold without
causing fears of unverified mineral exports.100 A major key to this plan was revitalizing
state-owned infrastructure along the land route, which had been commonly used before
the war.
Maniema is also interesting due to the coexistence of large-scale corporations and
artisanal miners.101 Most of the major deposits in Maniema are owned by Société Aurifère
du Kivu-Maniema (Sakima), a large state-owned enterprise. However, although it is
technically a large-scale mining company, Sakima lacks the resources to undertake fully
industrialized mining ventures. Rather than relying upon its own extractive capabilities to
profit, the company has chosen to allow artisanal miners to exploit its holdings and
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negotiate purchasing contracts with other companies interested in paying for the right to
purchase and process conflict-free Congolese minerals. Because these companies pay
hefty sums for these rights, Sakima is able to rely upon independent artisanal miners to
produce major profits off of its mineral rights.102 This sets a good precedent for
partnerships between larger corporations and artisanal miners.
The DRC has also attempted to reform its tax laws in order to increase the impact
that industrial mining can have on local economies. By putting in place a 14 percent tax
on services provided by foreign suppliers, the government hopes to indirectly increase
local procurement. It also increased its taxes on the remuneration of working expatriates
from 10 to 50 percent for the first ten years of a project and to 100 percent for subsequent
years. Although these measures have been a start, these indirect measures have not had a
major benefit thus far. This is partially due to the unstable and often confusing business
environment that the DRC can present to foreign companies. Having been ranked 182nd
out of 183 in the International Finance Committee’s “Doing Business” rankings, there is
often a lack of clarity in the country’s frequently changing laws that results in a disregard
for rules.103 Additionally, these laws and their consequences often become messy legal
disputes. This is reflected in the average legal expenditures of extractive sector
companies in the DRC, which often reach about US$5 million per year, compared with
less than $500,000 in other developing nations with low ease of business rankings.104
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One important aspect in building a thriving mineral extraction industry is
transparency. The government of the DRC will have to build confidence in the safety of
doing business within their borders and assure both potential business partners and smallscale miners alike that the decisions that will build the new mining landscape have been
crafted in the best interest of the nation’s economic well-being and not the party in
power. One way that the DRC can tangibly begin to build transparency is by participating
in the African Peer Review Mechanism. Designed to hold African nations accountable
and reduce corruption in national governments without subjecting African Union member
nations to the judgment of developed Western nations or the United Nations as a whole,
the mechanism is a pre-existing means of auditing a potentially corrupt nation that allows
African nations to peer review one another. It calls for regular reporting and status
updates and has participation from other nations with large extractive industries,
including Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.105 The mechanism has been determined to be
largely successful in identifying problem areas from its first few rounds of reporting.106
One strategy for developing small-scale mining was a partnership with FINCA
DRC, an international microfinance organization that ran a mobile banking project in the
country.107 In order to emulate the existing financial planning system, the company
accepted applications for banking agents to engage clients in place of a physical bank
branch. However, these agents were generally small business owners themselves whose
top priorities were their own businesses and the company struggled to bring the network
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of agents to more rural areas, instead serving largely the Kinshasa metropolitan area.108
While it supported research that shows people in the DRC often prefer branchless
banking through a trusted agent, the project ultimately failed to have sufficient reach to
impact the poorest communities.109
While formalization and certification schemes that focus on empowering miners
to sell their minerals legally and for fair prices have seen some success already and there
has been a good precedent set for concession-sharing between industrial and artisanal
miners, the DRC has a long way to go before its mining reform strategies can be
considered robust enough to sustainably and peacefully develop the sector.
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Chapter 3: Case Studies
As more foreign companies begin to realize the financial opportunities that
mineral extraction in Africa presents, and nations recognize the essential role of small
scale mining in creating economic opportunity for the poor, managing a growing mining
sector is a common problem throughout the continent. As such, there is a wealth of ideas
and projects seeking to resolve the mining-associated issues of African nations. The
following ten case studies will provide essential lessons for guiding the growth of the
DRC’s mining industry. Some have seen success that mirrors the more effective policies
already attempted in the DRC, including Tanzania and Ghana, while some failed policies,
including those of Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, support the lessons the DRC has learned in
building decentralized formalization practices and the ineffectiveness of laws and
regulations that stand on their own.

Tanzania: Formalization and Local Procurement
Mining industry strategies in Tanzania focused on increasing the capacity of local
economies to provide the services that large-scale mining companies demanded at no loss
of quality from foreign producers, and increasing the availability of skilled labor
available in the Tanzanian workforce to increase the ability of local labor to compete with
foreign employees.
In 2009, the government of Tanzania performed a complete review of its national
mineral extraction policies, producing an updated Mineral Policy of 2009 that
emphasized key issues such as local participation in the mineral economy, transparency,
value adding activities, and human rights. It was a major change from the previous
38

  

mining policy, which solely endorsed attracting foreign direct investment through its
large-scale sector and took actual steps to benefit artisanal miners in addition to
increasing the multiplier effect of large-scale operations.
Strategies for increasing the multiplier effect and creating jobs centered around
increasing local procurement of goods and services and local content in the industrial
workforce. First, the Tanzanian government passed policies that required minimum
percentages for local procurement in order to ensure that the presence of industrial
mining firms could maximize the benefit to the local community. Since 2001, the mining
industry had shown an increasingly heavy preference for foreign-produced goods in the
production supply chain, but with the Mineral Policy of 2009, the government reformed
its internal auditing policies to discount foreign companies selling goods at domestic
dealerships from when calculating local content.110 Under this new review policy, it was
discovered that previously, the local content of the mining industry was approximately 02 percent.111 While the difference still remains at a pronounced US$200 million in favor
of foreign procurement, the government’s policies have had a significant impact on the
amount of success data available and the real amount of local content in mining supply
chains.112 To do this, the government had to also increase the capacity of local small
businesses to meet the demand for high quality goods and services that large-scale
mining was creating to make it feasible for foreign companies to abide by local content
regulations.
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In order to provide high quality goods and services within the local economy, the
government maintained provisions for foreign quality control experts to legally work
with large-scale companies and local small enterprises to ensure that products met the
health and quality standards of the international firms.113 This allowed Tanzanianproduced goods to become high-quality, low-cost substitutes for foreign-produced goods.
In order to make domestic skilled labor more available, the government partnered
with large-scale companies to create the Integrated Mine Technical Training Program
(IMTT) to train entry level mining staff.114 Government bodies and foreign companies
also created the Arusha Technical College (NECTA) and Moshi VETA College in 2009
as a joint venture to train highly skilled staff. As of March 2016, there have been over
500 graduates of IMTT alone, 95 percent of which have found employment in mining or
mining-related industries.115
The supply chain regulations also saw some success. For example, one catering
firm was able to establish contracts with four major industrial mining companies while
maintaining about 98 percent local staff.116 Infusing local businesses with quality-control
experts from abroad made local options a cheap and high quality substitute for foreign
companies while maintaining the maximum involvement of local staff. This maintenance
of quality at low costs and the procurement plan requirements of the new mining policy

                                                                                                 
113

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. "Local Content: Tanzania Mining."
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.
114
Kinyondo, Abel. "Local content in the Tanzanian mining sector." Chr. Michelsen
Institute.
115
Ibid.
116
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. "Local Content: Tanzania Mining."
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.
40

  

made building local procurement in this industry an easy choice for most companies.117
This case also provides a good example of indirect poverty alleviation from mining. Job
creation associated with developing the mining sector does not necessarily have to focus
solely on mining jobs, but rather can tap fully into the multiplying potential of the
industry.
As the country began to see violence between industrial miners and local
communities and conflicts between commercial operations, artisanal miners, and
Tanzanian police escalated, the government took a highly inclusive approach to building
a less violent business ecosystem.118 First, the Tanzanian government utilized existing
artisanal mining associations to more effectively engage those involved in the informal
economy.119 The Tanzanian government also utilized a multi-stakeholder partnership
initiative (MSPI) to build cooperation between artisanal and industrial mining groups.
With funding and support from the World Bank, the government of Tanzania required
that corporations provide education and support for health, safety, and science and
technology needs.120
The keys to Tanzania’s victories in reforming its mineral extraction sector have
been transparency, stakeholder engagement, and decentralization.121 Through the MSPI,
the government was able to force large mining companies and small mining organizations
to work together on projects and facilitate the transfer of resources and expertise from
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foreign corporations to local miners. Although not every nation will be able to replicate
the exact project, especially given the heavy involvement of the World Bank Group and
its funding mechanisms, the spirit of the program provides a good model for developing
artisanal and industrial mining in tandem. Essentially, the initiative hinged upon
corporations considering Tanzania’s natural resources worth a marginal extra investment.
At its core, an MSPI ensures that even where the government undertakes industrial
mining to obtain greater tax and export revenues, the poor communities that rely on
artisanal mining and can’t afford to compete with larger mine sites still see some benefit
from industrialization.122 This cooperation and high participation rate was possible in part
because of the transparency and confidence that the government worked to maintain
through open channels of dialogue throughout project implementation, regular
communication with the heads of local mining collectives, and tangible commitments to
ensuring that artisanal miners did not get crowded out.123 It is also worth noting that
following the success these programs and the initial World Bank grant that funded the
MSPI, Tanzania began to receive increased funding from the World Bank Group,
including a US$3 million grant to be distributed among over a thousand artisanal miners,
with specific attention paid to women in the industry.124 That Tanzania’s specific
undertakings garnered increased grants from international development banks is another
key takeaway from this success.
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Following the implementation of this program Tanzania’s rating in the Fraser
Institute Policy Perception Index, a quantification of mining companies’ comfort levels
with doing business under a specific government’s regulations, grew by over ten points
from the 32.4 it held before the project began.125 (See Appendix C) Total revenues in
mining communities where the project was implemented als doubled when inflation and
fluctuations in gold prices were taken into account.126
The Democratic Republic of the Congo could be a good candidate for similar
programs given its similar history of conflict between police, industrial mining
companies, and artisanal miners. This strategy for de-escalation could prove valuable for
managing small-scale violence. Additionally, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has
proven as recently as 2010 that it is a good candidate for receiving World Bank Group
grants and loans. However, given the failure of the Promines project and the subsequent
dispute with the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank Group may be wary
of injecting more money into major mining projects in the DRC until the nation reforms
and reorganizes its licensing and contract management policies.
Small forms of cooperation have also helped improve harmony between large and
small-scale miners and have increased the degree of safety involved in artisanal
mining.127 Because the use of explosives is so prolific in Tanzania’s mining industry, and
many artisanal miners do not have facilities to safely store them, Tanzania undertook two
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policies to safety and formal participation. In one project, the Department of Mines
manufactured mobile explosives storage boxes that could be sold to registered miners at a
price just high enough to offset production costs. In another project, a limestone quarry
managed by Tanzania’s National Services, essentially the army, shared a deposit with a
small community of artisanal miners.128 In order to improve cooperation, the army
contracted out a certified blast operator to safely conduct the explosives work in the
artisanal mine, paid from the yields from the mine. In order to store small explosives and
further improve safety, the army allowed artisanal miners to share their explosive storage
facilities. This increased compliance with explosive regulations, empowered artisanal
miners to operate under a greater degree of formal legality, and increased cooperation and
goodwill between industrial and artisanal miners on the ground.129
In Tanzania, a major piece of the approach to harmonizing artisanal and industrial
mining and concentrating mineral extraction profits within the poorest communities was
formalizing the artisanal mining sector. By once again leveraging existing mining
collectives, the government was able to effectively implement a new licensing system
and effectively educate small-scale miners about the changes. Additionally, by
distributing information about newly vacant plots of land and putting in place policies to
limit the amount of time a foreign corporation can hold a title without developing the
land, the government created strong incentives for miners to buy into the new system. As
a result, Tanzania saw vastly increased, although not perfectly complete, participation in
the newly formalized artisanal mining sector.
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Formalization has not hurt participation in the artisanal mining sector in any
statistically significant way.130 Since the changes, trading outposts have become hubs for
economic activity. In Kahama, a trading town previous lacking vitality, the population
has more than tripled, with banks, gas stations and hospitality businesses filling the
previously sleepy streets.131
Between 2007 and 2012, the overall poverty rate in Tanzania decreased by 6.2
percent.132 While this cannot be attributed entirely to mining, as the sector composes only
about 3.3 percent133 of Tanzania’s diverse economy as of 2013, research has shown that
not only was artisanal mining an essential factor in poverty alleviation in those villages
with mineral deposits nearby, but it also helped to reduce vulnerability, particularly for
farmers, and in some instances even allowed women to become financially well-off
independently of local men by entering the service industry that sprang up to support the
miners.134

Côte d’Ivoire: Attracting Investment and Corporate Social Responsibility
While corporate social responsibility in Tanzania is still implemented on a siteby-site basis, within the Côte d’Ivoire, requirements for this and local procurement are
written into its laws. Legally, first priority for construction, services, and supplies must
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be given to qualified Ivorian companies and first priority for jobs must be given to
qualified Ivorian staff. In addition, any company seeking to hold a mining convention
with the government must implement and finance a training program for local employees
to increase their contributions to the mining sector and their ownership over the
operations. The companies must also implement and finance training programs for local
small businesses in order to increase the number of qualified Ivorian companies available
to support the mining sector with goods and services. Finally, companies must work with
employees of the government’s mining administration to train engineers and geologists.
All of these requirements have had little negative impact upon the growth of the Côte
d’Ivoire’s industrial mining sector, as companies continually seek to increase their
holdings and investments. Burkina Faso has seen similar success with legislation like
this, written with the express purpose of gradually replacing expatriate personnel with
increasingly qualified local professionals.
The Côte d’Ivoire proves a good model for the DRC because of its history of
internal violence. Much of the initial growth in the Côte d’Ivoire’s mining sector
occurred when the country was suffering from civil unrest and violence that cause the
majority of the country’s foreign investors to pull out, leaving its major industries largely
lacking support from foreign capital.135 Following the violence of the 2009 coup, the
country made a commitment to diversify its agriculture-dependent economy and
welcomed foreign mining companies into its borders, enjoying an explosion of foreign
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and domestic investment.136 Since these policies were implemented in 2012, the Côte
d’Ivoire’s Policy Perception Index has grown by 4 points as of 2015.137 While this may
seem like a negligible change, it is notable that the Côte d’Ivoire is one of the only
nations to have seen an overall trend of positive change from between 2012 and 2015, as
the majority of African nations that the survey pertained to saw net losses.138 The vast
majority of companies that found the Côte d’Ivoire’s policies amenable to doing business
reported feeling that its policies encouraged investment, rather than merely not
discouraging them.139 The biggest complaint that nations had about the policies in the
Côte d’Ivoire that hurt its score was the length of time it takes to get permits approved,
which companies saw as excessive. The Côte d’Ivoire also scores at about 50 percent on
regular enforcement and punitive policies either encouraging or not discouraging
investment, compared to just under 25 percent in Guinea.140

Guinea: Regulating Local Content
Mineral extraction accounts for approximately 17 percent of Guinea’s GDP and
over 50 percent of all of the country’s exports, representing a significant portion of the
economy.141
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Guinea also sets relatively stringent requirements for local content from industrial
mining. The country’s mining policy operates on a scaled system whereby quotas for
local procurement increase with each successive year of operation. Sourcing
requirements for goods and services peak at 30 percent from Guinean firms after the
eleventh year of operation, while employment requirements cap at 90 percent for
managerial staff and 100 percent for other staff for well-established mining operations.
To better enforce these stringent requirements, the country also put into place a limit of
visa duration for expatriate employees in order to enforce turnover and encourage the use
of Guinean staff. It also requires that from the conception of a new project, a Guinean
national be named deputy general manager, and after the fifth year of operation, a
Guinean national must be named general manager. Finally, the government requires that
companies finance training programs for recent graduates and maintain regular and
transparent reporting on local procurement. Despite having the most stringent new
mining policies on corporate social responsibility, Guinea, too, continues to see major
growth in its mining sector, although the Côte d’Ivoire is expected to overtake it as the
primary powerhouse within the region. Following the 2013 policy overhaul, Guinea’s
policy perception index grew by 16 points and although they remained above the levels
seen before its chaotic 2011 policy review, companies have been rating it progressively
lower by year.142 While this does not tell the full story of whether Guinea’s policies are a
success, it is worth noting the changes in foreign investors’ willingness to undertake or
expand mining projects under the nation’s policy regime. Guinea’s labor regulations were
specifically cited as the largest factor in the falling favorability of perceptions. A manager
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at a large-scale company doing business in Guinea called for less burden on private
companies and reforms of the public-private benefit sharing models.

Ethiopia: Building the Beneficiation Economy
In Ethiopia, efforts to increase the poverty-alleviation impact of the minerals
sector revolved around beneficiation, or the process of adding value to mining yields by
processing, refining, cutting and polishing minerals and gemstones. Although mining
comprises less than five percent of the agriculture-dominated economy,143 with almost
100 million people living below the international poverty line, opportunities for the rural
poor to increase their incomes are extremely important.144 One such opportunity is the
rich gemstone market. Ethiopia is the world’s second largest exporter of opals, which
account for over 90 percent of the country's gemstone exports. The multi-million-dollar
opal industry is operated almost entirely by artisanal miners.145
However, despite the lack of competition with major industrial producers, the
actual profits that miners receive are very low. In the sapphire trade, for example, the
artisanal miner generally receives only about 5 percent of the cut stone’s final value.146 In
contrast, buyers and exporting companies that set up outposts in rural areas see profits of
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up to 39,000 percent of the original buying price.147 This inequality is due largely to the
oversupply of rough colored gemstones, unavailability of information regarding the true
price of an uncut gemstone, and the poverty of miners that limits their power to negotiate.
In 2013, the Ethiopian government put in place a law banning the export of rough
gemstones, believing that exporting uncut gems constituted a major economic loss for the
country. This policy largely failed, and where it increased profits, these largely went to
foreign exporters who employed foreign laborers, and did not benefit artisanal mining
communities.148 This was due largely to the fact that lapidary businesses demand a great
degree of skill to operate, and demand a large amount of capital to start.149 Ethiopia’s
relatively unskilled gem cutters could not compete on the international market, and the
implementation of the law unaccompanied by measures to increase access to lapidary
training and small business loans led many miners to resort to black market sales to
protect their livelihoods.150
This law was then amended into one requiring that 40 percent of gemstone
exports be cut domestically.151 In order to ease the burden of meeting this goal, the
government established seven lapidary colleges to train gem cutters in 2009, with
particular emphasis on the inclusion of women.152 These were embedded in local
                                                                                                 
147

Kyngdon et al. "An Analysis of the Commercial Potential of Ethiopia's Coloured
Gemstone Industry." The World Bank Group: Energy and Extractives, June 2016.
Accessed January 12, 2017.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid.
152
Collins, Nina, and Lynda Lawson. "Investigating Approaches to Working with
Artisanal and Small-scale Miners: A Compendium of Strategies and Reports from the
Field.", University of Queensland, July 2014. Accessed March 22, 2017.
50

  

polytechnic schools as separate departments. They offered a year-and-a-half-long full
program with competitive selection, and, for students who were not admitted to the full
program, a 30 day vocational training to provide points of entry into the labor market.153
Only one such program remains operational and has graduated approximately 300
students.154 The programs struggled from a general lack of return on investment for their
students, which contributed to a difficulty in finding sustainable funding, and a shortage
of qualified Ethiopian teachers with the necessary expertise.155 Graduating students
struggled to find the necessary capital to formalize their own businesses, despite demand
for their work being more than sufficient.156
Additionally, in order to incentivize exporters to sell their stones close to the
world price and pay miners a fair sum, and to ensure a good return on investment for
those who sought out an education for highly skilled work, the government put in place a
price floor on the export of uncut stones.157
Still, according to government figures, only about 4.8 percent of gemstones being
produced and sold have been cut domestically, which supports data suggesting that over
two thirds of opals produced in Ethiopia are being exported outside of official channels.
This heavy black market activity is driven in part by the price floor, which was set too
high for the majority of stones to be purchased.158 Only the top one percent of yields, on
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average, were of high enough quality to purchase at the minimum export price, forcing
the majority of product to be sold on the black market in order for miners to sustain their
families.159
The low rate of compliance with the 40 percent rule is due to the combination of
failed programs and policies that Ethiopia’s government attempted. While the country’s
lapidary training programs failed to produce an adequate number of sufficiently skilled
gem cutters and provide them with the capital required to start and maintain small
businesses, the price floor and the resulting relative ease of using black market channels
also provided an incentive for subsistence miners to bypass this rule. Even with these
failures, however, Ethiopia’s case is an important example of creating more robust
livelihood options around mining. Where other alternative livelihoods like agriculture
generally fail, value addition training was sufficiently compelling to attract aspiring small
business owners to more profitable non-mining activities. Those who did graduate from
the lapidary college found that demand for their work was high and miners and exporters
were making a good faith effort to employ their services, the major barrier being the
difficulty of securing loans to purchase the high grade equipment needed to cut
gemstones with internationally competitive quality. Although the original total ban on
exporting uncut gems came too suddenly and without sufficient government support for
the industry to be successful, the partial ban was met much more amenably and saw a
greater degree of good faith efforts to comply.160
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Zimbabwe: Formalization and Beneficiation
When Zimbabwe attempted to formalize its artisanal gold mining sector, the
nation saw worsening standards of living for those affected by the new rules. As a result,
the policies saw very little actual buy in and so, in reality, increased the amount of illicit,
unregulated mining that occurred.161 Zimbabwe’s 2008 formalization strategy relied
heavily on centralized power, relinquishing only a small degree of control to local
government, a change from the decentralization strategy it undertook during the
1990’s.162 This occurred during a time of economic instability, when the party in power
was already moving to consolidate authority over rural resource management on a larger
scale. This process largely started with criminalizing unregulated mining and the arrest of
25,000 people, a move which, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center,
negatively impacted the livelihoods of over a million people.163 As a result of the
criminalization of informal mining and the resulting shut down of mining activities,
artisanal mining output in the country dropped from 17 tonnes to 987 kg per year.164
One success for Zimbabwe came in encouraging cooperation between large and
small-scale miners and compliance with explosives regulations. In the Shamva mine, a
large industrial mining site that shares its deposit with a group of small-scale miners, the
industrial miners shared their explosive storage facilities with the artisanal miners,
allowing them to better comply with the legal requirements for safe mining and building
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cooperation between the two groups by allowing the presence of the large-scale mine to
directly benefit the small-scale miners.165
In the same region, the government attempted a development project called the
Shamva Mining Centre in 1989. While artisanal mining was a relatively common
livelihood, miners struggled to find the capacity to refine minerals and increase their
value before sale due to the heavy specialized equipment the process demanded.166 At the
time, the artisanal miners of Zimbabwe were well-organized in the Small-Scale Miners
Association of Zimbabwe and the Government of Zimbabwe Ministry of Mines used
assistance from the Intermediate Technology Development Group and funding from
European Union-based NGOs and national governments to create a joint mining initiative
with these small-scale miners.167 The project’s primary goals were to create jobs, share
best practices information among miners, and to train miners in health and safety
standards while opening up opportunities for small-scale miners to process and refine
minerals.168 By 1995, the facility was used by over 227 miners on a regular basis and
employed 30 people, and average production had increased from nine tons per day in
1989 to 57 tons of ore per day. Use of the mill peaked at serving 400 miners.169 And
some miners’ incomes increased by over 30 percent during the mill’s peak operational
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period.170 However, the mill also began to encounter problems. As demand for the mill’s
resources and facilities increased, miners found themselves waiting up to six weeks to
process their ores.171 To combat this, the Small-Scale Miners Association placed a ten-ton
floor on the amount of ore that could be brought in for processing at one time, effectively
excluding the poorest, most small-scale artisanal miners from using the facility. 172By
January 2001, the center had been leased out for management by a local miner due to
cash flow problems under the Small-Scale Miners Association’s management and
continued to operate well under capacity.173

Nigeria: Incentivizing Organization
In Nigeria, a country where industrial oil operations are heavily prioritized as the
main formal mechanism of the extractive sector, 90 percent of solid minerals mining
comes from artisanal and small-scale miners.174 These miners have traditionally lacked
both the capacity to grow their operations and the capital needed to make them more
effective and efficient. Additionally, the government of Nigeria found their regulatory
frameworks, such as the Mineral and Mining Act, difficult to enforce due to the highly
informal nature of the sector.175
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In order to both aid and regulate the artisanal mining sector, the Nigerian
government sought to facilitate some organization within the ASM community. In order
to do so, legislators first performed a review of existing mining law and regulations to
ensure that there were no major legal barriers to organization. Then, in order to
incentivize organization, the government offered a series of micro grants distributed
through well-organized and well-performing mining associations.176 As a result, Nigeria
now has over 600 registered cooperatives through which it can communicate with miners
and regulate mining activities, which allows the government to effectively pursue job
creation programs, environmental rehabilitation, and revenue collection.177

Ghana: Harmonizing Large-and Small-Scale Mining
By 2003, ASGM in Ghana was worth 79.8 million us and comprised 9.5 percent
of total gold production in Ghana.178 60 percent of the country’s mining labor force is
employed at small-scale mines, according to the Minerals Commission and Ghana
Chamber of Mines.179The sector accounted for 9.5 percent of gold production and 82
percent of diamond production in 2003.180
Because much of Ghana’s mining economy is informal and occurs in poor, rural
areas, access to banking resources is sparse. Ghana’s 23-site banking network only
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reaching about 5 percent of households nationally and captures only 40 percent of the
country’s total money supply.181 This lack of access to rural banking has significant
impacts on artisanal and small-scale mining communities in that it limits the number of
lines of credit available to miners who want to grow their operations and reduces the
propensity to save and manage money.182 This ultimately reduces the power of artisanal
mining to lift communities out of subsistence working conditions. This gap in bank
service also presents a major missed opportunity to incentivize miners to operate more
formally.
In order to remedy this, the government worked with Barclays Bank of Ghana to
create an official banking system that emulated traditional tribal practices. This came in
the form of training and formal employment of Susu Collectors, trusted members of the
community who hold and manage money on behalf of wage earners.183 This network
includes approximately 4,000 Susu who collect money from clients regularly and return it
at the end of each month, increasing the degree of security in bankless money storage.184
The program created accounts within the bank for Susu collectors to deposit funds,
increasing the security of their finances, and trained them in credit management and risk
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and opened up microloan options that they could then lend on to their clients, increasing
access to microcredit in the country.185
Leveraging the Susu network to provide financial planning advising and help
these rural communities access to formal credit provided a powerful tool for increasing
financial formality and stability. The program worked largely because of the personal
relationships that community members built over time with their mobile banker, allowing
them to make informed recommendations on the suitability of loan candidates and bridge
the information and understanding gap between banks and rural communities.186 By tying
record keeping and transparency into access to loans and financial management, the
Ghanaian banking system greatly incentivized honest self-reporting of livelihoods and
business activities and allowed small business to grow in mining towns.187 With access to
credit and formal banking greatly increased for rural communities as a result of programs
like this, the amount of money being loaned to rural communities in Ghana increased
28.6 percent between 2001 and 2002.188
This presents a powerful example of the importance of harmonizing development
goals and official regulations with existing cultural practices to increase the ease of
adoption when seeking formalization. Rather than expending development resources
putting in place a new, centralized program shaped by the government, Ghana’s policy
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makers were able to shape development policies around the organically-developed
systems of financial management that were already in use throughout the country,
empowering its agents to provide microcredit services while increasing the amount of the
money supply passing through official and documented channels. The microfinance
trainings also focused largely on lending to groups of people rather than individuals, a
practice which reduced the individual burden of the loan and therefore the likelihood that
the enterprise would fail to repay it.189
In 2006, the Ghanaian government began to take steps to harmonize its artisanal
mining sector with large-scale industrial operations. Because at the time, 13.1 percent of
the total land area of Ghana was under concession to mining and mineral exploration
countries, including 70 percent of the land in the country’s most mineral rich regions,
there was little land available for artisanal miners to legally claim.190 This issue was
exacerbated by laws forbidding the transfer of mining titles once issued.191 This presents
a major challenge for mining land management, because while industrial mining
companies must purchase the rights to large swaths of land in order to discover deposits
that are rich enough to merit mining with heavy machinery, much of the land goes unused
due to a lack of deposits or deposits that are too sparse to be mined industrially.192 These
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patches of land, however, are generally ideal for artisanal and small-scale miners who
generally operate without machinery.193
In addition, the government made a commitment to formalizing its ASM
associations further by creating District Mining Committees and undertook stakeholder
inclusion practices on its Legal Frameworks on ASM.194 Still, fully formalizing the
mining sector in Ghana remains a major challenge. The Minerals Commission of Ghana
and the Chamber of Mines estimates that in one region alone, over 6,000 illegal artisanal
gold mines are in operation, compared to 117 registered ones195. Other research from the
World Bank puts the estimated total number of artisanal miners operating illegally in
Ghana at over one million as of 2006.196 One reason for the low adoption rate of
formalized mining is the historical difficulty of obtaining a mining licence, due to over
allocation of land to industrial mining.
This, however, cannot account fully for the resistance to change. Artisanal mining
is deeply tied to tribal tradition, meaning that older traditional rules are generally
respected.197 Not only are traditional community leaders who command a great degree of
respect generally also leaders in mining operations, they are often a major part of
permitting illegal mining. Many local chiefs receive fees to endorse a miner’s claim to a
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plot of land, and despite lacking any real legal standing to do so, the respect and
traditional authority they command is usually enough for community members to also
respect the claim.198
The Ghanaian government has also created competing disincentives to formalize
through other programs. For example, in 1989, when artisanal mining was first legalized,
the government created the Precious Minerals Marketing Association, a governmentowned enterprise that buys minerals from artisanal miners and employs craftspeople to
manufacture jewelry for export.199 While the company itself has been helpful for ensuring
that miners are paid fair prices and increasing employment, with over 700 buyers actively
employed in addition to artisan staff, the company does not discriminate between legally
and illegally mined minerals.200 This lack of certification not only removes any incentive
the company may be able to provide for formal participation, it also creates a conflict of
interest in mining regulation, since the profits from the company obtained in part from
selling illegally-obtained minerals go to fund the institutions that regulate the mining
industry.201 The company’s prices also often cannot compete with those of illegal buyers,
meaning that even artisanal miners legally operating officially-designated small-scale
mines have an incentive to participate in the black market and those already operating
illegal mines have no incentive to rejoin the formal system.202
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The reluctance of artisanal miners to follow official regulations has created
conflict with large-scale mining companies. For example, in 2008 at the Obuasi Gold
Mine, a large mining concession owned by AngloGold Ashanti, is at risk of closure due
to the activities of artisanal miners seeking control of the site.203 The small-scale miners
have set fire to electrical cables, set of explosives underground, attacked equipment, and
caused 30 mine employees to become trapped underground at a cost approaching US$5
million.204 In an interview with local news outlets, John Owusu, General Manager of
Corporate Affairs at AngloGold Ashanti, said of the incident,
“[the miners] have literally not only taken over the streets and vital section
of the Obuasi mine but have rendered security forces in Obuasi, especially
the police matchless, thanks to their sheer numbers and the crude weapons
they carry. They have become a terror and anybody who interferes in their
nefarious activities is calmed down with violence.”205
The conflicts have stemmed largely from the belief that local lands are owned by
local communities, as was tradition. The presence of large-scale mining companies on
land customarily controlled by regional chiefs presents a disrespect to the community and
a gap in understanding between the government, rural communities, and industrial
mining companies.206 An interview conducted in 1996 following a similar incident
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revealed the miners’ reasoning for combating the industrial operation: “This is our own
land and we, and not anybody from anywhere, decides how to use it to our benefit. If we
can farm on this land, why can’t we mine the gold in it?”207 Further interviews conducted
after the Obuasi incident in 2008 revealed that 80 percent of miners still shared that
opinion.208
Frustrated with the ongoing conflicts and the difficulty and expense they
presented, AngloGold Ashanti partnered with the Ghana Chamber of Mines and Minerals
Commission to improve its relations with the Obuasi Municipal Artisanal Miners
Association, a 10,000-member, highly organized mining association that sought mining
claims on AngloGold’s concession.209 The government identified areas upon the
concession that would be well-suited for exploitation by artisanal miners, but inefficient
for industrial operations and began a formal registration process for miners to access
smaller sub-concessions.210 This has ameliorated the conflict to some degree in the area,
with mining association making significant steps toward restoring order among frustrated
members and restore good faith and AngloGold honoring the concessions of the artisanal
miners.211
A similar approach was adopted by Abosso Goldfields Limited through a policy
named “live and let live,” The initiative sought to accommodate artisanal miners who
                                                                                                 
207

Ibid.
Ibid.
209
Collins, Nina, and Lynda Lawson. "Investigating Approaches to Working with
Artisanal and Small-scale Miners: A Compendium of Strategies and Reports from the
Field."
210
Ibid.
211
Okoh, Godfried Appiah. "Grievance and conflict in Ghana's gold mining industry: The
case of Obuasi."
208

63

  

wished to mine upon its concession so long as they stayed within designated artisanal
mining zones.212 This was predicated upon two lines of thinking: one, that indigenous
communities have long been artisanal miners and the industry holds significant cultural
and social significance within the groups, and that organization and mutual respect would
increase the safety and productivity of mining for both parties by reducing the associated
violence and assuaging the suspicions that indigenous miners held about government
intervention and large-scale mining companies.213
The policy suffered growing pains from the start. Almost 600 miners moved in to
exploit the land, quickly encroaching upon the high-grade deposits officially reserved for
industrial operations and leading to continued violence.214 In response, a management
committee composed of two miners from each of the five local groups, an assembly
person from each community, local chiefs, and an officer from Ghana’s national bureau
of investigation was formed to formalize the rules and practices of sharing the site. The
result was 740 artisanal miners registering with the company and receiving photo
identification cards that allowed them to access designated sites. An official buyer was
hired to periodically visit the sites and purchase the yields on behalf of the company.215
After one year, this number had been reduced to 360 because the company had absorbed
many of the locals into its own operation through employment programs, miners had
discovered other profitable ventures that served the regional mining industry and started
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small enterprises of their own to contract with the larger company, or migrant workers
who had failed to find permanent employment had left the region.216
Although this program was put in place during a time when gold prices were
relatively low and mining low-grade deposits was fairly uneconomical,217 reducing the
company’s incentive to mine all of its concession, the trend of companies recognizing the
economic and social benefits of working with artisanal miners is promising. If
stakeholder engagement occurs proactively and effectively, these policies can be
achieved without the threat of violence that jump started the negotiation processes in
Ghana. Additionally, following Abosso Goldfields’ model of integrating artisanal miners
into the industrial sector after establishing rapport through good faith negotiations can
help combat the unsustainable nature of sharing limited mineral deposits with increasing
numbers of artisanal miners, preventing future outbreaks of conflict when reserves
become more scarce.
The key to this initiative’s success was a willingness on both sides to recognize
the opportunity for mutual benefit and overcome anger or distrust. The companies and
communities alike need to be willing to negotiate and make concessions, but when they
are it produces a relatively stable community of formal artisanal miners working in
cooperation with the large-scale mining industry, resulting in economic growth and
reduced tension.
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Zambia: The Need for Capital Development and Conservation
In Zambia, economic difficulties and political instability caused the large-scale
mining sector to scale back significantly218, leading the government to turn back to
artisanal mining as a key driver of economic growth, even including it as a major part of
its official Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.219 This has allowed it to become a national
priority and it is actively monitored by the national government and given priority access
to aid funding from the European Union and the World Bank.220 Copper is the dominant
extractive mineral, followed by gemstones.221 The mining industry, which is primarily
artisanal, comprised approximately three percent of GDP during the 2010-2013 period.222
However, as a side effect of the growth of artisanal mining, Zambia began to
suffer from increased illegal mining activities. Formalization efforts focused on
decentralization, clarifying mineral rights allocations, collection of revenues, increased
monitoring, and providing technical advising and assistance.223 These decentralization
efforts also came with extreme difficulties in cost management, though, with regional
mining centers lacking a consistent ability to collect revenues.224
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Much of the international community recognizes microloans as a means of
injecting the capital needed to jumpstart small businesses in rural or poor areas. However,
Zambia presents the counterexample to this. The mining center revolving fund was
established to provide small loans to artisanal miners in order to increase capacity. This
was combined with the Citizens’ Empowerment Commission, a fund from the European
Union used to fund the Zambia Development Assistance program, which provided
capacity building workshops and exhibition booths, and a gemstone processing center to
ease the sale and export of small-scale mining yields.225 Despite this, the Mining Sector
Revolving Fund was depleted after ten years in operation due to miners’ inability to
convert the loans into profits and repay them.226 Although the gemstone processing center
did increase the amount of value adding activities taking place, an important step toward
converting an artisanal mining sector into an economically profitable part of the
economy, the project was ultimately drained of funding.227 In a talk given at the Capacity
Building Workshop on Formalization of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Eastern and
Southern Africa, Gertrude Munda of the Federation of Small-scale Miners Association of
Zambia asserted that this is due in part to the government’s failure to commit fully to
promoting artisanal mining on a policy level.228
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Lending on a larger scale also failed to meaningfully impact the capacities of
Zambian miners.229 Through the Mining Sector Diversification Programme, 16.5 million
euros of aid money were set aside to be loaned out to mining companies and
cooperatives.230 However, interest rates in Zambia hovered at approximately 25-30
percent, meaning that many small-scale operations found it difficult to justify borrowing.
Additionally, the access requirements were highly stringent.231 According to the Ministry
of Finance, by 2006, only three million euros of this money had been accessed, with only
nine firms participating in the program during the 2003-2005 period.232 Ultimately,
lending-based capacity-building at the company and cooperative level failed due to a
combination of high interest rates which created added risk for borrowing and stringent
loan requirements. The lesson here is that while this program may have succeeded under
different economic circumstances, when interest rates are high and increasing, it is an
inopportune time to encourage the nation’s poor to risk their financial security on a
development loan without offering some sort of interest rate relief. Additionally, it is
notable that the major barrier in accessing lines of credit for Zambian miners was not the
availability of funds, but rather an inability to meaningfully mobilize them.
One additional challenge that the Zambian government faced in managing
artisanal mining was protecting the Mwela Rock Art National Monument, a site that is
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currently up for UNESCO World Heritage Site designation.233 Mining activities in local
communities put these paintings at risk of destruction, but rather than outlawing mining
within a government-mandated perimeter around the site, Community Conservation
Committees were formed. Composed of local leaders and miners, these committees met
to designate “safe areas” around the monument where the community could agree to
cease mining activities in order to preserve their own cultural heritage.234 While there was
some initial resistance from miners that did not wish to comply with the committee’s
decisions and miners largely rejected opportunities to sell artisan crafts at the monument
as an alternate source of income, the project has ultimately seen success in reducing the
degradation of the site. World Bank officials involved in the project noted that the
process took a great degree of patience and negotiation.235
While the project initially overlooked the importance of establishing the
importance of monument preservation itself before asking the community to take
initiative, the project ultimately saw some success in making rural communities the
regents of their own land. The high degree of community participation increased overall
respect for the decisions of the committees and although outside prompting and oversight
was necessary, the destruction of culturally important sites has been greatly reduced, if
not entirely halted.
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Uganda: Peer Learning and Sustainability
From 2003-2011, the Ugandan Government, in partnership with the World Bank,
conducted the Uganda Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources project, a multipart initiative that focused on information technology development and peer learning for
sustainability.236 The program was developed through a highly consultative process that
involved miners from many different communities, large-scale mining industry
executives, and government officials at both national and local levels.237 The goals of the
project were to address environmental degradation, social strains between mining
operations and nearby communities, stakeholder disputes within the mining industry
itself, and a general lack of information upon which to base policy decisions.238 The
program, although largely government-developed, was funded by the World Bank
Group.239
In order to address rural miners, the committee developed training materials for
mining management and sustainable practices that covered best practices for mining
methods, contributed by actual artisanal and large-scale miners, advice for handling legal
and regulatory issues and explanations of existing laws, occupational safety and health
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for artisanal miners especially, and community development procedures.240 Miners were
also trained to better manage their capital and mineral resources.241
These training materials were delivered to over 200 local mining leaders,
community leaders, NGO staff, and government officials. In addition, train the trainer
sessions were hosted in which 180 community leaders, composed of both men and
women, were taught to deliver the materials to their communities, resulting in over 1,000
people trained by the end of monitoring.242 The program also used radio broadcasts to
deliver the information to highly distributed communities with low literacy rates.243
Another part of the initiative involved improving geological survey information
and access to information. The external financing from the World Bank helped the
government to build high-resolution mapping information for 85 percent of the country’s
land area and improved the detail and efficiency of the mining registry, making policy
information, miner's rights, plot status, and associated fees more clear and transparent for
artisanal miners and foreign investors alike.244 Delays in processing requests for
geological information were reduced from 14 days to one day, on average.245
The increased access to information, transparency, and ongoing best practices
trainings had a major impact on Uganda’s mining industry, overall. The program directly
led to the formation of over 50 artisanal mining associations, which increased
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productivity and allowed for to be pooled into Village Savings and Loan Associations
and reinvested back into small loans for housing and school fees and financial security
funds to protect members against unforeseeable hardship such as fires.246 Some of these
organizations were so successful that they became joint ventures with international largescale mining companies.247 During the period of the program’s operation, artisanal
mining profits increased from US$3 per day to US$9 per day for precious metals, and
from US$7.5 per day to US$20 per day for industrial metals.248 After receiving the
training, artisanal miners also began using timber shaft supports in pit mines, wearing
dust masks, and practicing more stable quarry cutting techniques.249
Profits and investor relations in the industrial mining sector also improved.
Royalties and license fees collected from large-scale mining companies increased from
.63 million in 2004 to 5.28 million by the end of 2011, with 35 investors purchasing
geological mapping data from the government.250 Exploratory licenses sold increased
from 190 in 2005 to 607 by the end of 2011.251
This project shows the impact of information availability on mining efficiency
and profits. At the community level, conducting sustainable trainings that were designed
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to be passed from community member to community member empowered miners to
undertake change of their own volition, increasing the voluntary adoption rates of safety
regulations, and drastically increased mining profits and the propensity to save. By
bundling comprehensive information on best practices and money management, the links
between each topic and the incentive to adopt the techniques was clear, and multiple
groups of miners were lifted out of the subsistence cycle. At the government level,
income from mining increased dramatically, creating an availability of funds to pay back
development loans and reinvest in domestic economic development. At the core of this
success was the government’s decision to invest development funding into information
services.

Sierra Leone: Controlling the Peace-Spoiling Impacts of Subterranean Wealth
Sierra Leone is a country which, much like the DRC, has a high degree of ethnic
diversity and has suffered a great deal of conflict and instability due in part to its
subterranean wealth. Like the DRC, conflict has forced Sierra Leone to largely abandon
industrial mining efforts and achieve most of its mining output through artisanal and
small-scale mines. This, however, has been made difficult by the lack of formalized legal
mining practices and the high degree of black market activity which perpetuates violence
in mines.
After achieving independence, Sierra Leone had a bright economic and political
future, with rich diamond deposits and a multi-party democratic government.252 This
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situation quickly devolved into conflict, however, after the death of the first Prime
Minister. 253Years of poor, inequitable governing led to the formation of rebel groups
such as the Revolutionary United Front, which launched attacks around the nation’s
borders and in 1991 launched the decade long war that would define the country for years
to come.254 The cited reasons for this conflict include state failure due to corruption and
mismanagement of state resources and the abundance of diamond deposits, which
became major sites of conflict and have majorly contributed to financing the war.255 In
the peace talks that followed this violence, Sierra Leone presents several important
lessons in maintaining peace even with the tempting presence of vast subterranean
wealth.
In the Lomé peace accords, the warring parties agreed to a provision that the
profits from diamonds and other extractive minerals would only be used for the greater
benefit of the people of Sierra Leone, a provision that was amenable to both parties.256
However, the person appointed to ensure that this was carried out was an officer of the
Revolutionary United Front with a long record of predatory actions toward civilians and
mineral management.257 This, combined with the total pardoning of combatants from
domestic or international prosecution, made it difficult for the people of Sierra Leone to
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accept the peace accords as legitimate and in their best interest, leading to perpetuated
instability.258
When lasting peace was finally achieved, it was following a United Nations
decision to recognize diamonds as one of the primary perpetuating forces in the conflict
and an increased security focus in diamond-producing areas.259 Although diamond
embargoes were put in place to limit the financing of rebel groups and the illegal
involvement of Liberia, these had only a minor real impact on the number of rough
diamonds being sold.260 According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sierra
Leone and Liberia, these were largely effective only insofar as it showed that more
powerful international actors were keeping an eye on the internal peace processes within
Sierra Leone.261 Government endorsement of and participation in the Kimberly Process’s
certificate of origin system has managed to significantly reduce the number of diamonds
smuggled out of the country annually, but because by 2003 no system for legally
converting diamonds into economic well-being on a large-scale through government
licensing has been achieved, the illegal diamond market remained alive and well in Sierra
Leone.262
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The lessons to take away from this case are that even when peace is achieved,
national policy planning must take into account the ability of subterranean wealth to
spark a resurgence of violence. Transparent plans that the public can have faith in are
essential for successful post-conflict fiscal planning and providing legal avenues through
which miners can maintain their livelihoods is essential to controlling black market
activities. Much like the DRC, Sierra Leone is not especially resource-rich in real terms.
During the conflict period, diamond mines were estimated to produce approximately US
$70 million per year, similar to the output of subsistence rice farming.263 This money was
enough to provide millions a year in financing for armed groups and add fuel to the civil
war, but not enough to make Sierra Leone an especially rich country.264 The real power
of the diamond deposits comes as either a spoiler of peace or an economic opportunity
for the poor.
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Lessons and Trends
The strategies by which the government can create a thriving, profitable and
sustainable mining sector that concentrates its benefits into community living below the
poverty line can be divided into six classifications:
●   Increasing the multiplier effect of large-scale mining by concentrating the benefits
of industrialization into local communities
●   Formalization, which prevents miners from being exploited by black market
activities and improves access to development resources,
●   Beneficiation, which increases miners’ profits by empowering them to undertake
value adding activities and creates greater demand for skilled labor
●   Capital resources development, which provides for the growth of small
businesses,
●   Harmonization and conflict control, which reduce violence-induced inefficiencies
and prevent increased mining activities from spoiling peace agreements,
●   Conservation and environmental safety, which increase the sustainability of
artisanal mining

Large-Scale Mining and the Multiplier Effect
The cornerstone of beneficiation is increasing the local content of industrial
mining, either by increasing the company’s use of human capital in its own operations or
by providing opportunities for local small business owners to sign large contracts with
the company. Essential factors in building beneficiation policies are existing goodwill
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between companies and local communities and actual will on the part of the company.
Lessons from Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea show that in cases where countries attempt to
achieve local human capital content by passing laws and regulations, companies
generally tend to judge the favorability of investing in the country outside of the context
of corporate social responsibility requirements, basing their investment decisions instead
upon other factors such as the ease of obtaining an exploration permit or concession or
the availability of detailed information to support their operations.
Nevertheless, these laws are often difficult to enforce, as evidenced by the low
(less than 50 percent) enforcement rates across Africa. Where possible, many companies
will still attempt to work around them, and although investment continued, industrial
mining administrators operating in Guinea cited the stringent beneficiation laws as a
major pain point of the operation. The major determining factor in whether or not a
country can demand compliance with extra regulations, other than voluntary buy in from
companies, is most likely the availability of other options for mining equally rich deposits
in countries that have less stringent regulations, which dictates the terms of bargaining in
signing a concession.
One essential factor for success in considering such regulations is the availability
of local services and labor that companies can use to satisfy their contracting needs.
Tanzania succeeded in this by jointly creating educational programs with large mining
firms. Because they were funded in part from ongoing industrial mining activities, they
did not suffer from the scarcity of funding and technical experts that Ethiopia’s similar
programs did and because the training was highly job-specific and informed by the needs
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of the companies helping to fund it, the graduates had a high rate of unemployment and
job success.
Another important lesson from Tanzania is quality control. The local small
businesses that signed contracts with large corporations were able to do so because they
operated at a low cost while maintaining the level of quality one might find in a foreign
provider. This is especially important for sectors like catering and construction materials.
While one of the issues the DRC is facing is abuse and exploitation of miners by
foreign companies, negotiation for social responsibility and local content may not be a
lost cause. For one, the DRC has major contracts with companies that other countries
have succeeded in negotiating with before, including AngloGold Ashanti, which sets a
good precedent for at least some of the mining companies operating in the DRC to make
good faith efforts to comply with regulations for local benefit to the best of their ability.
Additionally, renegotiation of mining contracts to be more equitable to local communities
has already happened in the DRC’s recent history. Following the contract audit
conducted by the Carter Center, a number of contracts were successfully renegotiated and
enforced. While it remains to be seen how these precedents translate directly into local
benefit outcomes within the DRC and contract negotiations, like other regulatory options,
cannot exist in a vacuum, creating the legal framework upon which the country can build
future policies that benefit the poor is an essential step toward long term sustainability.
Also important for increasing the impact of large-scale mining is improving the
investment climate of the country to attract foreign capital. The DRC has had significant
issues in the past, with the Promines project specifically, in maintaining good relations
with its foreign investors. In part, this is due to its complicated licensing rules and a lack
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of clear information available. The Uganda case has shown the impact that directing
development financing into information services and geological surveying can have on
investor relations and artisanal mining alike, and should the DRC follow suit in
developing these resources, it is likely to have a significant impact on large-scale mining,
the ease of acquiring artisanal mining licenses, and the likelihood that formalization
efforts will succeed.

Formalization of Artisanal Mining
Lessons from Sierra Leone and Ethiopia show that creating outlets for legal
artisanal mining activities is an important step in reducing black market activities and
increasing regulation within the industry to prevent violence, environmental degradation,
and exploitation of workers. Conversely, Zimbabwe shows the importance of building a
formalization process that empowers, rather than criminalizes miners so that individuals
will actually buy into the system.
In the case of both Tanzania and Nigeria, a major piece of formalization was the
creation of mining associations, which then became the government’s mechanism for
communication with and regulation of the sector. The important caveat to this is that in
both cases, these organizations were allowed to form organically. Their composition was
not decided arbitrarily or simply by proximity through any form of government
regulation. Rather, they were formed of miners who actually chose to work harmoniously
with one another in order to achieve incentives like micro grants, mutual protection and
capacity-building. This natural organization of miners is particularly important to
countries like the DRC that have a strong cultural history of tribalism combined with
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years of severe internal displacement that could result in a lack of harmony and
cooperation should the government attempt to force miners to organize by geography
alone. This is supported by additional evidence from Zimbabwe, where the highly
centralized government and lack of regional input to regulatory policies resulted in a
formalization process that was rejected by most of those involved in the informal mining
sector. The cases of Ghana and Zambia also support the assertion that in order for
formalization to have a high rate of buy in, the legal system needs to fit into traditional
community practices, rather than attempting to regulate away the existing system, unless
there is a significant incentive to change. In building out formalized artisanal mining
policies, the actual structure of the licensing system, as long as it is transparent and
relatively easy to use, is far less important than the means and degree of community
involvement throughout the development and implementation process.
Along with formalization comes the necessity for certification schemes and
incentives that put pressure on miners to turn their backs on the black market. In Sierra
Leone, for example, the adoption of the Kimberly process had a major impact on the
number of miners using more formal channels, despite there being insufficient resources
to allow them to operate legally. Conversely, in Ghana, where no certification scheme
was adopted for the government-owned mineral export company, and no real financial
incentive to turn away from illegal exporting was provided, the black market remained
the dominant exporter despite robust formalization and sector development policies.
However, formalization and certification schemes cannot solve the issue alone, as the
DRC learned with its attempts to enforce the mining ban in the Bisie region. They can,
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however, begin to see limited success if they empower miners to receive better prices for
their minerals, as with the centre de négocé system in Rubaya.

Beneficiation
Once a country has a formal artisanal mining sector, development efforts need to
be constructed to engage it. Ethiopia’s case shows the danger in constructing policies in a
vacuum, without a support scaffolding to help miners respond to new rules and
regulations. Policy, training and skill development efforts, and projects that increase the
availability of capital in developing communities need to work in tandem to address the
needs of stakeholders across government and artisanal mining communities.
Nonetheless, the DRC may need to undertake policy solutions to encourage valueadding activities to take place domestically. Because so much of the country’s mineral
wealth is smuggled and processed in Rwanda, a significant opportunity for increased
profits and job creation is being lost. By providing miners with the incentives and the
capabilities to produce more valuable products themselves, the government can reduce
the amount of spillage leaving its borders.
One fairly popular means of further developing the mining industry is
encouraging domestic markets to undertake value adding activities like mineral
processing and refining, gemstone cutting, and jewelry production. This not only
increases the export value of mining yields, but increases the multiplier effect associated
with the mining industry by creating demand for increasingly skilled labor. This new
demand can be achieved artificially, as it was in Ethiopia, but only if a government is
certain that there is sufficient skilled labor to meet the newly increased demand and that
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artisans are skilled enough to produce goods that can compete on the international
market.
Governments can also respond to existing interest in value adding operations by
providing artisanal miners with access to the heavy machinery and specialized equipment
that mineral refinement and processing already demands. These facilities clearly increase
miners’ profits and employment, but can suffer from over demand and a lack of funding.
In Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia alike, the government failed to continue regularly
funding processing facilities and skill acquisition programs after the original development
project ended, preventing them from having a significant ongoing benefit. Still, this too
presents an opportunity for improvement. Because artisanal gemstone producers in the
DRC face almost no domestic competition from large-scale companies, there is great
potential for producing high end products for export and growing the gemstone economy
without being out-competed by industrial operations, which is particularly important in a
quality-conscious gemstone market. These strategies have the added benefit of allowing
miners to access the equipment needed to safely employ mercury and handle other
possibly dangerous minerals while limiting environmental contamination.
The sustainability of programs like these can be increased by implementing “train
the trainer” programs like those that were used in Uganda. By channelling development
funding into programs that teach community leaders how to show their peers to perform
highly skilled or necessary activities, the government can create an impact that far
exceeds the number of people benefitting from a direct training program. In Uganda’s
case, community peers proved highly effective teachers.
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Development of Capital Resources
This logic can also be applied to capital resources development. Providing access
to lines of credit is another essential step without which efforts to lift miners out of
subsistence cycles are likely to fail, but microloans alone tend to have high failure and
low impact rates. However, Ghana’s rural banking projects presents a good example of
low-risk financial resource development. By integrating the program into existing
structures of financial management and empowering Susus, who already commanded a
high degree of trust among rural miners, to teach financial skills and administer loans, the
government created a highly sustainable development practice with a high degree of buy
in. This community-oriented approach to credit avoided the issues that other nations,
including Zambia, saw with larger scale microfinance organizations suffering from high
interest rates and low repayment rates.
Rural banking in the DRC is similarly dependent on highly trusted community
members that are appointed money managers on behalf of many different households.
Although branchless banking that was reliant upon agents who applied to become
financial managers and work under a microfinance company failed to adequately adapt to
sparsely populated areas, the model used in Ghana is promising in that it focuses on
supporting existing financial managers in rural communities and using them as access
points to extend banking and microfinance services well outside the range of physical
branches. Although financing for micro loans and proper training for these financial
managers is crucial, they do serve the purpose of lessening the burden of making contact
with rural community members on an individual basis and extend the impact of existing
microloan programs.
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The same logic applied in the Uganda case. By providing educational resources
that were supported by the increased availability of small grants, the government was
able to allow rural miners to convert the trainings into entrepreneurial success. While
microfinance in and of itself is often a highly flawed policy rather than the magic bullet
for sustainable development, the lack of capital resources available to miners is a major
barrier to converting other programs into real development and needs to be addressed as a
part of a robust mining sector development initiative.

Harmonization and Conflict Control
The DRC’s ability to control for the resurgence of violence over control of
subterranean wealth will largely determine whether lasting peace and a thriving mineral
extraction sector are simultaneously feasible for the country. Two primary types of
violence have the possibility to spoil the peace. For one, conflict between artisanal and
large-scale miners has the potential to inhibit poverty-reduction and industry
development efforts greatly, not to mention cause millions of dollars of damage and the
loss of human life, which is other cases has nearly forced industrial mines to shut down.
Additionally, if post-conflict mineral management strategies are not handled with the
utmost care it could bring about another round of armed conflict and rebellion.
As was evident in the case of Sierra Leone, post-conflict peace treaties with
armed rebels are precarious at best and present a lot of opportunities for rejection. While
pacifying rebels is necessary, there is a serious danger in giving too much ground or
making arbitrary decisions without public consultation. The most important factors then
in determining whether mineral wealth is allowed to spoil whatever peace is achieved
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will be transparency with the public and appointing trustworthy and popular trustees of
public policy and funding. Once again, stakeholder inclusion is a necessary part of this
process.
To prevent violence between artisanal miners and foreign companies,
governments need to carefully consider the pain points of local communities and work to
harmonize globalization and industrialization with traditional mining and land
management practices. Currently, conflict management efforts in the DRC focus largely
on apprehending and arresting artisanal miners protesting at industrial mines, but if
sustainable cooperation is to be built and the issue of forcing rural communities to
relocate for industrial mines is to be resolved in actual practice, the actual relationship
between artisanal and large-scale miners must be repaired. “Live and let live” policies
like those used in Ghana have the potential to both provide a practical solution for land
and resource sharing that allows artisanal miners to maintain their livelihoods, and a
means of building trust, cooperation and communication between large-scale and smallscale miners. While a willingness to share on the part of the company is necessary, in
Ghana’s case, the strategy not only reduced violence but ultimately contributed to
formalization and local content acquisition in the industrial sector. Once again, the
essential factor in success was persistent stakeholder engagement. Artisanal miners
understandably distrusted initial attempts at cooperation and it was only through shows of
good faith and the creation of a highly inclusive steering committee that was conscious of
demographic representation that the artisanal mines were brought into the partnership.
Evidence from Tanzania also supports the potential for cooperation between large and
small-scale miners through project cooperation and inclusion within industrial operations.
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There are also harmonization efforts that can actually make the presence of largescale companies in rural areas into a tangible benefit for local communities at very low or
negligible cost to the company. While corporate social responsibility initiatives like the
creation of colleges and training programs can be costly and do not necessarily support
miners who continue in small-scale operations, harmonization efforts like those used in
Tanzania and Zimbabwe rely upon the company’s willingness to cooperate, rather than
the availability of funding for community benefit programs. Not only did these initiatives
address the practical concerns of safely storing and managing the use of explosives in
small-scale mining, they created regular communication and cooperation between the
industrial operation and the artisanal miners and created a noticeable service that the
presence of large-scale mines provided to artisanal operations, helping to remedy the
distrust that pervaded many of the negotiations.

Conservation and Environmental safety
Cooperation with industrial mines can also contribute to efforts to mitigate the
negative environmental impacts of mining. For example, sharing storage and reclamation
facilities for explosives and dangerous chemicals like mercury can lessen the burden on
artisanal miners. Mercury control technologies already exist, the major issue is in the
expense and difficulty of distributing them to small mines. By using large-scale mining
facilities as an access point, the government can greatly reduce the burden of delivery.
The state-funded processing centers seen in Zambia and Zimbabwe can also present a
good model for delivering access to mercury control technologies and heavy equipment
that can increase efficiency.
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With regards to conservation and deforestation or pollution management, Zambia
has shown that community trusteeship is a good starting point. If local miners are brought
into the conservation process as active stakeholders through thorough engagement and
education about the importance of conservation itself, they do have the knowledge and
ability to draw and enforce safe zones around important ecological or spiritual areas.
Programs like these can be extended to begin the process of protecting forests and rivers.
Communities do not always possess an existing will to protect these features, especially
when their profit margins are so thin, but thorough engagement and an understanding that
conservation is a process rather than a project can help to preserve even sites with little
clear economic value, like the Mwela Rock Paintings.
Although the conservation situation in the DRC is nowhere near dire at this time,
building a sense of responsibility over natural resources in mining communities early on
will lay the foundation for much more smooth future engagement with trusteeship-based
conservation efforts.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The trends in these policy options reflect a change in the traditional positioning of
stakeholders in development reform. In order to properly implement these plans, the
government needs to be thought of, both on the part of international financing and
oversight bodies and by its own agents, as a mediator, in addition to its role as a
policymaker. Because successful implementation of regulatory mechanisms so heavily
depends on stakeholder engagement, voluntary buy-in, and harmonization with existing
informal structures, governments need to assume the role of partner and unbiased third
party when managing artisanal mining land and contested industrial concessions. But
rather than hindering the government as a lawmaking body, as one might assume, this reenvisioned role and emphasis on stakeholder engagement can empower the government
to be a representative of its constituents’ will by ensuring that policy decisions are
reflective of public opinion in affected and traditionally underrepresented areas rather
than centralized decisions imposed upon them.
Likewise, the role of the private corporation in mining sector development must
also change. Where previously, multinational corporations have been considered the
problem, the aggressor and the exploiter in developing nations, successful mining sector
reform under this strategy demands that private corporations become benefactors and
regulators, stewards of a country’s natural resources and the communities that rely on
them. From taking on the role of facilitator in creating formal artisanal mining schemes to
providing for workers’ safety and environmental protection in small-scale mines, private
corporations must take on an obligation that goes beyond simple social responsibility.
This goodwill can, of course, be mandated in part by the government, but it also must
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come from an internal impetus, whether this be altruistic or in recognition of the
economic benefits of harmonization. Under this development scheme, these companies
are not so much regulated as entrusted.
By the same token, the mentality of engagement with local leaders in traditionally
underrepresented communities, like rural mining ones, must change. Whereas
traditionally these people are governed and imposed upon, in many circumstances local
leaders who have a track record of respect among mining communities and are
understanding of minority needs must become the guiding voices of reform, the ones who
decide which traditions must be upheld and respected in policy reform in order to
maximize public buy-in. Certainly, they can be engaged and educated, convinced of
better options, but ultimately it will be they who decide what concessions are acceptable
to them. This input will also be particularly important given the impacts of violence. As
the country heals and moves forward in tandem with rebuilding its economy, the voices
of the communities most affected by the conflict will help shape the recovery process so
that positive impact can be maximized. In a way, these communities become the
policymakers who envision the future shape of the country’s peacetime structure and
mining economy.
Additionally, a common lesson throughout the case studies was that a major
source of failure, even for well-constructed programs with high community uptake, can
fail due to unsustainable funding or management. This requires a change in the way that
development initiatives are viewed. Traditionally, these are seen as projects to be
implemented using foreign development funding with a limited period of oversight
before being left to either function independently for a time or shut down. Often, these
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projects end or greatly decline in impact once foreign capital no longer sustains them.
Instead, these initiatives need to be viewed as processes, ongoing programs in which
foreign development funding is merely the seed to build necessary infrastructure before
the project can achieve sustainability. This is particularly important in beneficiation and
higher education projects that have a limited number of individuals they can serve at one
time. Increasing the longevity of the program allows the impact to increase drastically.
Essentially, mining sector development boils down to a willingness to direct
industrial mining profits back into small-scale mining communities, whether by placing
responsibility on the shoulders of the company to increase its positive social impact or by
government program creation, the most direct route toward sustainably funding mining
programs is by using a portion of the country’s mining income to ensure longevity and
efficiency.
With this in mind, the great limiting factor in achieving a comprehensive policy
plan in the DRC is, of course, funding. Many of the projects these policy plans are
modeled upon relied on funding from external organizations like the World Bank Group
and the European Union. While the DRC has proven in the past that it has a strong bid to
receive such aid, acquiring the necessary funds to implement all of these policies at once
is unlikely. Because of this, it is important to prioritize the most sustainable solutions.
These arguably come in the harmonization and multiplier-effect-enhancing efforts that
allow small-scale miners to benefit from independently-funded large-scale operations.
Not only do these bring in large amounts of government revenue that can, if managed
properly, be effectively repurposed into other mining sector development projects, but
because industrial mining often involves value-adding capabilities of its own and has a
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proven tendency to assimilate cooperative local miners, it presents a good opportunity to
organically develop the industry. There is also another important reason to undertake
harmonization and assimilation first: concession-sharing agreements, while definite
breakthroughs in peacebuilding, are unsustainable due to the limited nature of
subterranean resources. As seen in Ghana’s case, as mineral prices increase and yields
become increasingly scarce, the profitability of using industrial equipment to mine lowgrade deposits traditionally only economical for small-scale operations will increase.
While this does not necessarily make artisanal mining within industrial concessions
impractical in the present, it does create a natural expiration date on the foreign
companies’ willingness to cooperate. Where possible, the government of the DRC should
encourage this cooperation in the present because of the tendency that other similar
programs have shown to encourage small-scale mining organizations to assimilate into
the larger company and to encourage miners to seek out more profitable livelihoods as
small business contractors supporting the maintenance of the larger business in industries
like catering, cleaning, or supply chain maintenance, allowing the integration of smallscale mining and large-scale mining to happen more organically. Undertaking these
harmonization and assimilation efforts early will ease the inevitable transition into an
increasingly industrialized mining sector and lay a foundation for future beneficiation,
conservation, and formalization work.
Still, other programs cannot be perfectly separated into stages. Capital
development, beneficiation, and education cannot generally be successful independently
of one another, as numerous case studies have shown. The best way to purposefully
mobilize limited funding is by gradually rolling out regional pilot projects that address
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and generously fund all three, rather than national development plans that spread funds
out on a much broader scale. These programs can then also be planned with the utmost
attention to local needs and limitations to ease implementation.
While the situation in the DRC is dire, the opportunities for post-conflict change
are impressive. Not only can successful implementation of a new mining policy improve
the quality of life for those living below the international poverty line, but success in the
DRC can set an international precedent for poverty alleviation and economic
development. Ineffective use of subterranean mineral resources and improper handling of
artisanal mining has hindered the development of many nations worldwide and prevented
many individuals from lifting themselves out of poverty. If successful, the DRC will
become an important case study for comprehensive mineral extraction management and
economic development that can be applied to other nations that are also at critical
moments for economic development.
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Appendix A
Reported Aggregate Mineral Production*265
Mineral

DRC Output as of 2005
(metric tons unless specified
otherwise)

Cobalt

51,000

Niobium and Tantalum
Copper

380
660,000

Gold (kg)

14,000

Silver (kg)

12,342

Germanium (kg)

18,000

Tin

5,700

Tungsten

185

Zinc

10,319

Diamond (total) (thousand
carats)

20,900

Diamond (artisanal

20,157

Diamond (large scale)
Crude steel

740
110,000

*Much mineral production was unreported and smuggled out through Uganda and Burundi,
especially in the case of gold
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States Geological Survey. "The Democratic republic of the Congo." Minerals
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Appendix  B  
  
Legal definitions of differences between artisanal and small scale mines266
Country

Means of Classification

Ghana

Level of Mechanization

Burkina Faso

Level of Mechanization

Ghana

Size of Concession

Zambia

Size of Concession

Zimbabwe

Size of Concession

South Africa

Degree of Capital Investment

Senegal

Production Levels
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Appendix C
Policy Perception Index Scores for Selected Countries267
Country

2015 Investment
Attractiveness Index (out of
100)

British Columbia

75.71

Alaska

83.96

Western Australia

87.35

Burkina Faso

71.88

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

59.37

Ethiopia

64.11

Ghana

71.27

Guinea

38.28

Côte d’Ivoire

67.99

South Africa

58.04

Tanzania

57.46

Zambia

57.48

Zimbabwe

41.45

China

58.48

Chile

79.81
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